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Abstract
We develop a theory of decidable inductive invariants for an infinite-state variant of the Applied
pi-calculus, with applications to automatic verification of stateful cryptographic protocols with
unbounded sessions/nonces. Since the problem is undecidable in general, we introduce depth-bounded
protocols, a strict generalisation of a class from the literature, for which our decidable analysis is
sound and complete. Our core contribution is a procedure to check that an invariant is inductive,
which implies that every reachable configuration satisfies it. Our invariants can capture security
properties like secrecy, can be inferred automatically, and represent an independently checkable
certificate of correctness. We provide a prototype implementation and we report on its performance
on some textbook examples.
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1 Introduction
Security protocols implement secure communication over insecure channels, by using crypto-
graphy. Despite underpinning virtually every communication over the internet, new flaws
that compromise security are routinely discovered in deployed protocols. Automatic protocol
verification is highly desirable, but also very challenging: the space of possible attacks is
infinite. Indeed, even under the assumption of perfect cryptography, security properties are
undecidable [20]. The most problematic feature for decidability is the necessity of considering
unboundedly many fresh random numbers, called nonces, to distinguish between various
sessions of the protocol. There has been a proliferation of verification tools [11, 3, 34, 10, 4, 25]
which can be categorised according to the way the undecidability issue is resolved. A first
approach is to only consider a bounded number of sessions, possibly missing attacks. A second
is to over-approximate the protocol’s behaviour by representing nonces with less precision,
possibly reporting spurious attacks. A third is to implement semi-algorithms, accepting that
the tools might never terminate on some protocols.
In this paper, we devise a sound and complete analysis, i.e. one that always terminates
with a correct answer, without need for approximations. We obtain this by developing
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2 Decidable Inductive Invariants for Cryptographic Protocols Verification
decision procedures for proving invariants of a rich sub-class of protocols with unbounded
sessions/nonces. An invariant is any property that holds for every reachable configuration. We
introduce depth-bounded protocols, a strict generalisation of the class of [18], and prove that
a class of invariants, called downward-closed, can be effectively represented using expressions
that we call limits. Our core technical results are a decision procedure for limit inclusion and
an algorithm called p̂ost that computes, from a limit L, a finite union of limits that represent
the (infinite) set of configurations reached in one step from L. By using these two components,
we obtain an algorithm to check if a limit is inductive, i.e. p̂ost(L) ⊆ L. An inductive limit
that contains the initial configuration is guaranteed to be an invariant for the protocol. We
show how to use this to prove a number of properties including depth-boundedness itself (a
semantic property), secrecy, and control-state reachability.
We define depth-bounded protocols as a subclass of a variant of the Applied pi-calculus [30],
with support for user-defined cryptographic primitives, secure and public channels, stateful
principals, a Dolev-Yao-style intruder [17] supporting modelling of dishonest participants
and leaks of old keys. In particular, our results apply to any set of cryptographic primitives
that satisfy some simple axioms; examples include (a)symmetric encryption, blind signatures,
hashes, XOR. To gain intuition about depth-boundedness, consider the set of messages
Γn = {e(k1)k2 , e(k2)k3 , . . . e(kn−1)kn} which “chains” key k1 to k2, k2 to k3 and so on,
obtaining an encryption chain of length n. A depth-bounded protocol cannot produce, or
be tricked to produce, such chains of unbounded length. Note that, when computing depth,
we only consider chains that are essential: the set Γn ∪ {kn} for example has depth 1 (for
any n) because it is equivalent to the set {k1, . . . , kn}. When there is a bound d on the
depth of reachable configurations, we say that the protocol is depth-bounded. We built
a proof-of-concept prototype tool to evaluate the approach, showing that many textbook
protocols fall into the depth-bounded class.
More precisely, bounding depth alone is not enough to obtain decidability [18]: one needs
to bound the size of messages too. For type-compliant protocols [2, 13] message size can
be bounded without excluding any security violation. More generally, for typical protocols
(including all our benchmarks), our inductive invariants can be computed on the size-bounded
model, and then generalised to invariants for the unrestricted version of the protocol.
Our approach has a number of notable properties. First, once a suitable inductive
invariant has been found, it can be provided as a certificate of correctness that can be
independently checked. Second, the search of a suitable invariant can be performed both
automatically (with a trade-off between precision and performance) or interactively. Third,
supporting unbounded nonces makes it possible to reason about properties like susceptibility
to known-plaintext attacks (Section 3.1). Finally, even coarse invariants inferred with our
method can be used to prune the search space of other model checking procedures.
Related work The pure pi-calculus version of depth-boundedness was originally proposed
in [26] and developed in [23, 35, 36]. Our work builds directly on [18], which introduced
depth-boundedness for the special case of secrecy of protocols using symmetric encryption.
We generalise to a strictly more expressive class of primitives and properties, a result that
requires much more sophisticated techniques and yields more powerful algorithms.
Our theory of invariants is framed in terms of ideal completions [21], which, to the best of
our knowledge, has not been instantiated to cryptographic protocols before. Our decidability
proofs introduce substantial new proof techniques to deal with an active intruder while being
parametric on the cryptographic primitives.
Types [16, 14, 15] can be used to capture and generalise common safe usages of crypto-
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graphic primitives, and reduce verification to constraints which can be solved efficiently. We
speculate that our domain of limits and the associated algorithms could be used to define an
expressive class of solvable constraints that could be integrated in type systems.
In [14, 22] two classes of protocols with unbounded nonces are shown to enjoy decidable
verification. They consider a less general calculus ((a)symmetric encryption only, with atomic
keys), different properties (only secrecy [22], trace equivalence [14]), and restrict protocols
using (similar) syntactic conditions, obtaining classes that are orthogonal to ours.
ProVerif [4] and Tamarin [25] are two mature tools with support for a wide range of
cryptographic primitives and expressive properties, and handle unbounded sessions. Both
programs employ semi-algorithms and may diverge on verification tasks. ProVerif is known to
terminate on so-called tagged protocols [6] which are incomparable to depth-bounded protocols.
Tamarin offers an interactive mode when a proof cannot be carried out automatically. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no characterisation for a class of protocols on which Tamarin
is guaranteed to terminate.
Outline Section 2 introduces the formal model and depth-bounded protocols. Section 3
presents our main theoretical results. In Section 4 we report on experiments with our tool
and discuss limitations. All omitted proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Formal Model
We introduce a variant of the Applied pi-calculus as our formal model of protocols. Following
the Dolev-Yao intruder model, we treat cryptographic primitives algebraically. Assume
an enumerable set of names a, b, · · · ∈ N . A signature Σ of constructors, is a finite set of
symbols f with their arity ar(f) ∈ N. The set of messages over Σ is the smallest set MΣ which
contains all names, and is closed under application of constructors. The domain of finite sets of
messages is KΣ := ℘f (MΣ). We define size(f(M1, . . . ,Mn)) := 1+max {size(Mi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
size(a) := 1, and names(a) := {a}, names(f(M1, . . . ,Mn)) :=
⋃n
i=1 names(Mi). Given
X ⊆ N and s ∈ N, we define MΣ,Xs := {M ∈MΣ | names(M) ⊆ X, size(M) ≤ s}. As is
standard, Γ,Γ′ and Γ,M stand for Γ ∪ Γ′ and Γ ∪ {M} respectively.
A substitution is a finite partial function θ : N ⇀MΣ; we write θ = [M1/x1, . . . , Mn/xn ],
abbreviated with [ ~M/~x], for the substitution with θ(xi) = Mi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We writeMθ
for the application of substitution θ to the message M , and extend the notation to sets of
messages Γθ := {Mθ | M ∈ Γ}. A substitution θ is a renaming of X ⊆ N if it is defined
on X, injective, and with θ(X) ⊆ N .
I Definition 1 (Intruder model). A derivability relation for a signature Σ, is a relation
` ⊆ KΣ ×MΣ. The pair I = (Σ,`) is an (effective) intruder model if ` is a (decidable)
derivability relation for Σ, and for all M,N ∈MΣ, Γ,Γ′ ∈ KΣ, a ∈ N :
M `M (Id)
Γ ⊆ Γ′ ∧ Γ `M =⇒ Γ′ `M (Mon)
Γ `M ∧ Γ,M ` N =⇒ Γ ` N (Cut)
M1, . . . ,Mn ` f(M1, . . . ,Mn) for every f ∈ Σ with ar(f) = n (Constr)
Γθ `Mθ ⇐⇒ Γ `M for any θ renaming of names(Γ) (Alpha)
Γ, a `M ∧ a 6∈ names(Γ,M) =⇒ Γ `M (Relevancy)
The knowledge ordering for I is the relation ≤kn ⊆ KΣ ×KΣ such that Γ1 ≤kn Γ2 if and only
if ∀M ∈MΣ : Γ1 `M =⇒ Γ2 `M. We write Γ1 ∼kn Γ2 if Γ1 ≤kn Γ2 and Γ2 ≤kn Γ1.
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M ∈ Γ
Γ `M Id
Γ ` K
Γ ` p(K) Pub
Γ, (M,N),M,N `M ′
Γ, (M,N) `M ′ PL
Γ `M Γ ` N
Γ ` (M,N) PR
Γ, e(M)K ` K Γ, e(M)K ,M,K ` N
Γ, e(M)K ` N SL
Γ `M Γ ` K
Γ ` e(M)K SR
Γ, a(M)p(K) ` K Γ, a(M)p(K),M,K ` N
Γ, a(M)p(K) ` N
AL
Γ `M Γ ` N
Γ ` a(M)N AR
Figure 1 Deduction rules for the derivability relation of Ien
The first three axioms deal exclusively with what it means to be a deduction relation:
what is known can be derived (Id); the more is known the more can be derived (Mon); what
can be derived is known (Cut). The (Constr) axiom ensures the intruder is able to construct
arbitrary messages by composing known messages. The (Alpha) axiom justifies α-renaming
in our calculus. The (Relevancy) axiom allows us to only consider boundedly many nonces
maliciously injected by the intruder, at each step of the protocol.
In the rest of the paper, unless otherwise specified, we fix an arbitrary effective intruder
model I and omit the corresponding superscripts.
I Proposition 2. Given Γ1,Γ2 ∈ KΣ, Γ1 ≤kn Γ2 if and only if ∀M ∈ Γ1 : Γ2 ` M . As a
consequence, if ` is decidable, so is ≤kn.
Our framework uses the derivability relation as a black box and does not rely on the
way it is specified (e.g. with a rewriting system or a deduction system). It is possible to
formalise as an effective intruder model cryptographic primitives such as XOR, hashes and
blind signatures. We present here, for illustration, a model of (a)symmetric encryption, and
elaborate on extensions in Appendix H. We find it convenient to specify it with a sequent
calculus in the style of [33]. This is an alternative to more intuitive natural-deduction-style
rules, which has the key advantage of being cut-free, while admitting cut. This simplifies
considerably the proofs of properties (e.g. Lemma 21) of the intruder model.
I Example 3 (Model of Encryption). Symmetric and asymmetric encryption can be modelled
using the signature Σen = {(·, ·) , e(·)· , a(·)· , p(·)}, where (M,N) pairs messages M and N ,
e(M)N represents the message M encrypted with symmetric key N , a(M)N represents the
messageM encrypted with asymmetric key N , and p(K) is the public key associated with the
private key K. The intruder model for (a)symmetric encryption is the model Ien = (Σen,`)
where ` is defined by the deduction rules in Figure 1.
I Proposition 4. The model Σen is an effective intruder model.
2.1 A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols
A common approach to model cryptographic primitives is to consider both constructors
(e.g. encryption) and destructors (e.g. decryption). Here messages only contain constructors,
and “destruction” is represented by pattern matching. Fix a finite signature Q of process
names (ranged over by Q) each of which has a fixed arity ar(Q) ∈ N. A protocol specification
consists of an initial process P and a finite set ∆ of (possibly recursive) definitions of the
form Q[x1, . . . , xn ] := A, with ar(Q) = n, where the syntax of P and A follows the grammar:
P ::= 0 | νx.P | P ‖P | 〈M〉 | Q[ ~M ] (process)
A ::= a〈M〉 | a(~x : M).P | A+A (action)
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Q1[ ~M1] , c〈N [ ~M ′/~x]〉.P1 +A1 Q2[ ~M2] , c(~x : N).P2 +A2
ν~a.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q1[ ~M1] ‖ Q2[ ~M2] ‖ C)→∆ ν~a.(〈Γ〉 ‖ P1 ‖ P2[ ~M ′/~x] ‖ C)
Comm
P ≡ P ′ →∆ Q′ ≡ Q
P →∆ Q
Struct
Q[ ~M ] , c〈M〉.P +A Γ ` c
ν~a.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q[ ~M ] ‖ C)→∆ ν~a.(〈Γ〉 ‖ 〈M〉 ‖ P ‖ C)
PubOut
Q[ ~M ] , c(~x : N).P +A Γ, ~y ` N [ ~M ′/~x] Γ ` c ~y fresh
ν~a.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q[ ~M ] ‖ C)→∆ ν~a.ν~y.(〈Γ〉 ‖ 〈~y〉 ‖ P [ ~M ′/~x] ‖ C)
PubIn
Figure 2 Operational semantics.
We use the vector notation ~x = x1, . . . , xn for lists of pairwise distinct names. In an action
a(~x : M).P , we call ~x : M the pattern, and P the continuation; processes Q[ ~M ] are called
process calls. If Γ = {M1, . . . ,Mk} is a finite set of messages, then 〈Γ〉 := 〈M1〉 ‖ . . . ‖ 〈Mk〉.
We define P 0 := 0 and Pn+1 := P ‖ Pn. For brevity, we assume the special name in is
known to the intruder. The internal action τ , is an abbreviation for in(x : x), for a fresh x.
Processes of the form 〈M〉 or Q[~a] are called sequential. The names ~x are bound in both ν~x.P
and c(~x : M).P . We denote the set of free names of a term P with fn(P ) and the set of bound
names with bn(P ). As is standard, we require, wlog, that fn(P ) ∩ bn(P ) = ∅. When nesting
restrictions ν~x.ν~y.P , we implicitly assume wlog that ~x and ~y are disjoint. We assume there
is at most one definition for each Q ∈ Q, and that for each definition Q[x1, . . . , xn ] := A,
fn(A) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn}. The set P consists of all processes over an underlying signature Q.
Structural congruence We write α= for standard α-equivalence. Structural congruence, ≡,
is the smallest congruence relation that includes α=, and is associative and commutative with
respect to ‖ and + with 0 as the neutral element, and satisfies the standard laws: νa.0 ≡ 0,
νa.νb.P ≡ νb.νa.P , and P ‖ νa.Q ≡ νa.(P ‖ Q) if a 6∈ fn(P ). Every process P is congruent
to a process in standard form:
ν~x.
(〈M1〉 ‖ · · · ‖ 〈Mm〉 ‖ Q1[ ~N1 ] ‖ · · · ‖ Qk[ ~Nk ]) (SF)
where every name in ~x occurs free in some subterm. We write sf(P ) for the standard form
of P , which is unique up to α-equivalence, and associativity and commutativity of parallel.
We abbreviate standard forms with ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q) where all the active messages are collected
in Γ, and Q is a parallel composition of process calls. Let sf(P ) be the expression (SF), we
define msg(P ) = {M1, . . . ,Mm} ∪
⋃k
i=1
~Ni. Thus msg(P ) is the set of messages appearing
in a term. When m = 0, k = 0, ~x = ∅, the expression (SF) is 0.
Reduction semantics One can think of standard forms ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q) as runtime configura-
tions of the protocol. They capture, at a specific point in time, the current relevant names
(which encode nonces/keys/data), the knowledge of the intruder Γ, and the local state of
each participant. A sequential term Q[ ~N ] represents a single participant in control state Q
with local knowledge of messages ~N .
Principals can communicate through channels; a channel known by the intruder is
considered insecure. An input action over an insecure channel can be fired if the intruder
can produce any message that matches the action’s pattern. An output c〈M〉 to an insecure
channel c leaks message M to the intruder, who can decide to forward it angelically to a
corresponding input over c (modelling an honest step) or hijack the communication.
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S[a, b, kas, kbs ] := in(na : (na, b)).νk.
(
〈e(k)kbs〉 ‖
〈
e(k)(na,kas)
〉
‖ S[a, b, kas, kbs ]
)
A1[a, b, kas ] := τ .νna.(〈(na, b)〉 ‖ A2[a, b, kas, na ] ‖ A1[a, b, kas ])
A2[a, b, kas, na ] := in
(
k : e(k)(na,kas)
)
.A3[a, b, kas, k ]
A3[a, b, kas, k ] := in(nb : e(nb)k).〈e(nb)(k,k)〉
B1[a, b, kbs ] := in(k : e(k)kbs).νnb.
(
〈e(nb)k〉 ‖ B2[a, b, kbs, nb, k ] ‖ B1[a, b, kbs ]
)
B2[a, b, kbs, nb, k ] := in(e(nb)(k,k)).Secret[k ]
Figure 3 Formal model of Example 9.
We write Q[ ~M ] , A if Q[~x] := A′ ∈ ∆ and A α= A′[ ~M/~x], up to commutativity and
associativity of +. The transition relation →∆ is defined in Figure 2. In Rule PubIn,
~y denotes all fresh names introduced by the intruder in this step. Thanks to (Relevancy),
one can wlog ignore transitions where fn(~y) 6⊆ fn( ~M ′), since unused names would simply
not contribute to the intruder knowledge. The sets reach∆(P ) := {Q | P →∗∆ Q} and
traces∆(P ) := {Q0 · · ·Qn | P ≡kn Q0 →∆ · · · →∆ Qn} collect the processes reachable from
P and all the transition sequences from P respectively, given the definitions ∆. We omit ∆
when unambiguous.
I Definition 5 (≡kn). Knowledge congruence, P ≡kn Q, is the smallest congruence that
includes ≡ and such that 〈Γ1〉 ≡kn 〈Γ2〉 if Γ1 ∼kn Γ2.
Knowledge congruence is also characterised by
P1 ≡kn P2 ⇐⇒ sf(P1) α= ν~x.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q) ∧ sf(P2) α= ν~x.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q) ∧ Γ1 ∼kn Γ2.
Intuitively, modulo derivability, two processes P ≡kn Q are indistinguishable to the intruder
and to the principals. Formally, if P ≡kn Q then the transitions systems (P,→∆) and
(Q,→∆) are isomorphic. We thus close the reduction semantics under knowledge congruence:
we add the rule that if P ≡kn P ′ →∆ Q′ ≡kn Q then P →∆ Q.
While knowledge congruence captures when two configurations are essentially the same,
knowledge embedding formalises the notion of “sub-configuration”.
I Definition 6 (Knowledge embedding). The knowledge embedding relation P1 vkn P2 holds
if P1 ≡ ν~x.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q), P2 ≡ ν~x.ν~y.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q ‖ Q′) and Γ1 ≤kn Γ2.
I Proposition 7. P1 ≡kn P2 if and only if P1 vkn P2 and P2 vkn P1.
I Theorem 8. Knowledge embedding is a simulation, that is, for all P , P ′ and Q, if P → Q
and P vkn P ′ then there is a Q′ such that P ′ → Q′ and Q vkn Q′.
I Example 9. Consider the following toy protocol, given in Alice&Bob notation, meant to
establish a new session key K between A and B through a trusted server S:
(1) A→ S : NA, B
(2) S → B : e(K)(NA,KAS), e(K)KBS
(3) B → A : e(K)(NA,KAS), e(NB)K
(4) A→ B : e(NB)(K,K)
Figure 3 shows the protocol formalised in our calculus. Assume the initial state is
P0 = νa, b, kas, kbs.(S[a, b, kas, kbs ] ‖ A1[a, b, kas] ‖ B1[a, b, kbs] ‖ 〈a, b〉).
Step (1) is initiated by A1 which sends some new name na to the server; since communication
is over an insecure channel, the message is just output without indicating the intended
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recipient. The server receives the message (or any message the intruder may decide to forge
instead) and outputs the fresh key k encrypted with kbs (the long-term key between B
and S) and with the pair (na, kas) (note the use of non-atomic encryption keys). In the
protocol, these two messages are sent to B but we model step (2) by B1 which just receives
the message relevant to B. The forwarding of e(k)(na,kas) from S to A is performed by the
intruder instead of B in the model.
In the last two steps, modelled by B2 and A3, B sends a nonce nb encrypted with k, to
challenge A to prove she knows k, which she does by sending back e(nb)(k,k). At this point, B
is convinced that by encrypting messages with k they will be only accessible to A. We model
this by making B2 transition to Secret[k ] after a successful challenge. We always assume
the definition Secret[k ] := in(k).Leak[k ]. A transition to Leak[k ] is only possible when the
intruder can derive k so we can check whether the secrecy assertion holds by checking that
no reachable process contains a call to Leak[k ].
Notice how A1 and B1 spawn both the continuation of the session and (recursively) a
process ready to start a new session. This creates the possibility of an unbounded number of
sessions, each of which will involve fresh na, nb, and k.
Threat model Our reduction semantics follows the Dolev-Yao attacker model in representing
the intruder’s interference: the intruder mediates every communication over insecure channels,
is able to create new names and analyse and construct messages from all the messages that
have been communicated insecurely so far. Threat models that go beyond Dolev-Yao include
dishonest participants and compromised old session keys. These aspects are not embedded
in the semantics, but can be modelled through the process definitions. If we wanted to
model compromised keys in Example 9, for instance, we could modify the definition of
B2 to B2[a, b, kbs, nb, k ] := in(e(nb)(k,k)).Secret[k ] + in(e(nb)(k,k)).〈k〉 which makes a non-
deterministic choice to declare k a secret, or to consider it as old and reveal it.
I Remark 10 (Implementable patterns). Our calculus represents message deconstruction
(e.g. decryption) with pattern matching. However, general pattern matching is too powerful:
a pattern like in(x, k : e(x)k) would obtain both the key k and the plaintext x from an
encrypted message! This is only a modelling problem: one should make sure all patterns
can be implemented using the cryptographic primitives. Consider a pattern ~x : M and let
Z = names(M) \ ~x; the pattern is implementable, if, for all θ : Z ⇀M, we have Mθ,Zθ ` y
for all y ∈ ~x.
2.2 Depth-Bounded Protocols
We can now define the class of depth-bounded protocols, a strict generalisation of the notion
in [18]. While the definitions of [18] depend on fixing the intruder to symmetric encryption
only, here we define it fully parametrically to the intruder model.
I Definition 11 (Depth). The nesting of restrictions of a term is given by the function
nestν(Q[~a]) := nestν(〈M〉) := nestν(0) := 0, nestν(νx.P ) := 1 + nestν(P ), nestν(P ‖ Q) :=
max(nestν(P ),nestν(Q)). The depth of a term is defined as the minimal nesting of restrictions
in its knowledge congruence class, depth(P ) := min {nestν(Q) | Q ≡kn P}.
I Lemma 12. Every Q is α-equivalent to a process Q′ such that |bn(Q′)| ≤ nestν(Q).
Consider for example P = νa, b, c.(〈a〉 ‖ 〈e(b)a〉 ‖ 〈e(c)b〉 ‖ 〈c〉) which has nestν(P ) = 3. The
process P is knowledge-congruent to Q = (νa.〈a〉 ‖ νb.〈b〉 ‖ νc.〈c〉) which has nestν(Q) = 1;
this gives us depth(P ) = nestν(Q) = 1. Although bn(Q) = {a, b, c}, by α-renaming all
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names to x we obtain Q′ = (νx.〈x〉 ‖ νx.〈x〉 ‖ νx.〈x〉) which has the property |bn(Q′)| ≤
nestν(Q) ≤ depth(P ). More generally, Lemma 12 says that processes of depth k can always
be represented using at most k unique names, by reusing names in disjoint scopes.
Let Ss := {P ∈ P | ∀M ∈ msg(P ) : size(M) ≤ s} be the set of processes containing
messages of size at most s. The set DXs,k is the set of processes of depth at most k ∈ N, with
free names in X, and messages not exceeding size s:
DXs,k := {P ∈ Ss | fn(P ) ⊆ X,∃Q ∈ Ss : Q ≡kn P ∧ nestν(Q) ≤ k}.
When starting from some initial process P0, every reachable process P has fn(P ) ⊆ fn(P0)
so X can always be fixed to be fn(P0). We therefore omit X from the superscripts to
unclutter notation. The set of processes reachable from P while respecting a size bound s is
the set reachs∆(P ) := {Q | P · · ·Q ∈ traces∆(P ) ∩ S∗s}.
I Definition 13. For some s, k ∈ N, we say the process P is (s, k)-bounded (w.r.t. a finite
set ∆ of definitions) if reachs∆(P ) ⊆ Ds,k, i.e. from P only processes of depth at most k can
be reached, in traces respecting the size bound s.
I Example 14. Example 9 is (3, 7)-bounded. We defer the proof of this fact to Section 3.6.
I Example 15 (Encryption Oracle). The definition E[k ] := in(x : x).(〈e(x)k〉 ‖ E[k]) leads
to unboundedness as soon as the initial process contains E[k ] for some k not known to the
intruder, and size bound such that x can match messages of size greater than 1. In such case,
the intruder can inject messages (ci, ci+1) for unboundedly many i, where ci are intruder-
generated nonces. Since k is secret, the resulting reachable configurations would contain
“encryption chains” of the form νk.νc1, . . . , cn.(〈e(c1, c2)k〉 ‖ 〈e(c2, c3)k〉 ‖ . . . 〈e(cn−1, cn)k〉).
When such chains appear in a set for unboundedly many n ∈ N, the set is not depth-bounded.
This encryption oracle pattern could be considered an anti-pattern because it can be exploited
for a chosen-plaintext attack on the key k. The pattern can be usually modified or constrained
to obtain a bounded protocol. One option is to limit the verification to only consider traces
where x is of size 1.1
The two bounds s and k are very different in nature. For size, we ignore any trace that
involves messages exceeding size s. Then we determine if the depth bound k is respected by
all remaining traces. Ignoring traces exceeding s is acceptable for protocols not susceptible
to type confusion attacks and is achieved in other tools by using typing. Our method can
however be pushed beyond this limitation: In Section 4.1, we show how the results of our
analysis on the traces of bounded message size, can be generalised to results that hold for
the unrestricted set of traces.
3 Ideal Completions for Security Protocols
Our main technical contributions are the proofs needed to show that (s, k)-bounded protocols
form a post-effective ideal completion in the sense of [8]. First we outline the significance
and applications of this result, and then proceed with the proofs.
1 In Tamarin one would obtain this by typing x:fresh.
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3.1 Downward-Closed Invariants and Security Properties
Suppose we want to establish that a protocol P fulfils some security requirement. In a typical
proof, one needs to establish many intermediate facts about executions of the protocol. For
example, part of the argument may hinge on some key k being always unknown to the
intruder. This kind of property is an invariant of the protocol: it holds at every step of an
execution. Formally, an invariant of P (under definitions ∆ and size constraint s) is any
set of processes that includes reachs∆(P ). For example, k is never leaked to the intruder
in executions of the protocol P if the set of processes Sk := {Q | 〈k〉 6vkn Q} —i.e. all the
processes where k is not public— is an invariant of P . We will focus here on the class of
vkn-downward-closed invariants. Formally, given a set of processes X, its vkn-downward
closure is the set X↓ := {Q | ∃P ∈ X : Q vkn P}. A set X is vkn-downward closed if X = X↓.
Many properties of interest are naturally downward closed. For example, the set Sk above is
downward-closed as 〈k〉 6vkn Q and Q′ vkn Q implies 〈k〉 6vkn Q′.
The problem we need to solve is, then, how to show that a given downward-closed set X
is an invariant for a given protocol. Formally, that corresponds to checking X ⊇ reachs∆(P )
which, by downward-closure of X, is equivalent to checking X ⊇ reachs∆(P )↓. To prove
the latter inclusion, our strategy is to find an inductive invariant that includes the initial
state P and that is included in X. Let posts∆(X) := {Q′ | ∃Q ∈ X,Q→ Q′ ∈ Ss} be the
set of processes reachable in one step from processes in X. An invariant X is inductive if
X ⊇ posts∆(X), which is equivalent to requiring X ⊇ posts∆(X)↓ if X is downward-closed.
Any inductive invariant that contains the initial process P will include reachs∆(P ).
To turn this proof strategy into an algorithm, we need three components:
1. a recursively enumerable finite representation of downward-closed sets,
2. a way to decide inclusion between two downward-closed sets, given their representation,
3. an algorithm (called p̂osts∆) to compute, given a finite representation of a downward-closed
set D, a finite representation of posts∆(D)↓.
Unfortunately, downward-closed sets cannot be finitely represented in general, especially
if one considers unbounded sessions/nonces. We will show, however, that we can devise
solutions to all three items above for downward-closed subsets of Ds,k, under a mild restriction
on the intruder model. Solving problems 1 to 3 amounts to proving that Ds,k admits a
post-effective ideal completion in the sense of [21, 8]. This implies that we can decide if
the reachable configurations satisfy any given downward-closed property, by adapting the
enumeration scheme presented in [8].
I Theorem 16. Given a property D ⊆ P, and a protocol P with definitions ∆, we write
P,∆ |=s D if reachs∆(P ) ⊆ D. If D ⊆ Ds,k is downward-closed, then P,∆ |=s D is decidable.
Proof. The algorithm runs two semi-procedures, Prover and Refuter, in parallel. The first
procedure, Prover, enumerates all the downward-closed subsets I of Ds,k. For each I, Prover
checks if
(a) P ∈ I,
(b) I is inductive, by checking p̂osts∆(I) ⊆ I, and
(c) I ⊆ D.
If we find such a set I, then we have proven reach∆(P ) ⊆ D, and the overall algorithm can
terminate returning “True”. The second procedure, Refuter, enumerates all Q ∈ reach∆(P )
and checks if Q 6∈ D, in which case the overall algorithm can terminate returning “False”.
When P,∆ |=s D holds, then, in the worst case, Prover will eventually consider the finite
representation of reachs∆(P )↓, which satisfies checks (a) to (c) above. In the case where
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P,∆ |=s D does not hold, Refuter would eventually find a reachable process not in D. In
either case, the algorithm terminates with the correct answer. J
The above algorithm can be used to decide the following properties.
Deciding (s, k)-boundedness The set Ds,k is itself downward-closed, so we can decide if P
is (s, k)-bounded, by deciding P,∆ |=s Ds,k.
Deciding control-state reachability and secrecy Control-state reachability asks whether
there is an execution of the protocol which reaches a process containing a process call Q[. . .]
for some given Q. Secrecy can be reduced to control-state reachability by introducing a
definition Secret[m] := in(m).Leak[m] (for a special process identifier Leak with no definition).
In the definition of the protocol one can call Secret[m] to mark some message m as a secret,
and secrecy corresponds to asking control-state (un)reachability for Leak.
If P is (s, k)-bounded, control-state reachability for Q from P , can decided by P,∆ |=s DQ,
where DQ is the (downward-closed) subset of Ds,k of processes that do not contain calls to Q.
Notice that, when P is arbitrary, the algorithm checks (s, k)-boundedness and control-state
reachability at the same time.
Absence of misauthentication A misauthentication happens when a principal a believes
she shares a secret n with b but b believes she shares the secret n with some other entity c. To
check this situation can never arise, we can produce the process Auth[a, b, n] when a believes
to share the secret n with b. Absence of misauthentication can be decided by P,∆ |=s A
where A = {Q ∈ Ds,k | νa, b, c, n.(Auth[a, b, n] ‖ Auth[b, c, n]) 6vkn Q }.
Susceptibility to known-plaintext attacks The task of guessing a symmetric key is made
much easier if it is possible for the attacker to have access to an arbitrarily large number of
known nonces encrypted with the same key k. We can model this situation by asking if:
∀n ∈ N : ∃Q ∈ reachs∆(P ) : Rn vkn Q where R = νm.(〈m〉 ‖ 〈e(m)k〉) (†)
If (†) holds for P then the intruder does have access to an unbounded supply of known
messages m encrypted with the same key k. Interestingly, the property becomes mean-
ingful only when considering unbounded number of nonces. Condition (†) is equivalent to
reachs∆(P )↓ ⊇ {Rn | n ∈ N}↓. If we find a downward-closed inductive invariant I for P ,
such that I 6⊇ {Rn | n ∈ N}↓, then we can be sure that (†) does not hold, and P is not
susceptible to known-plaintext attacks on k. We can therefore semi-decide (†) by enumerating
all candidate I. Contrary to the previous algorithms, we are not able to provide a Refuter
procedure (we conjecture the problem is undecidable). We can get a decision procedure if,
instead of unboundedly many plaintext-encrypted pairs we ask whether a sufficiently high,
user-provided number N of such pairs can be produced. The problem can be extended to
cover the case where the known-plaintext can be any message of size at most s.
Notice how, if the protocol is found to satisfy the property, the algorithms above can
output an inductive invariant acting as an independently checkable certificate of correctness.
Although the mentioned security properties alone do not cover the full security requirements,
an effectively presented invariant can provide the foundations to prove further properties.
The algorithm of Theorem 16 relies on expensive enumeration schemes, which are mainly
a theoretical device to prove decidability. In a more practical setting, the candidate invariants
can be supplied by the user and refined interactively, avoiding the need for the enumeration
of Prover, or they can be inferred as we describe in Section 3.6.
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3.2 Bounded Processes are Well-Quasi-Ordered
We construct finite representations of downward-closed invariants by making use of the
algebraic structure of the quasi-order (Ds,k,vkn). A relation v ⊆ S × S over some set S is a
quasi-order (qo) if it is reflexive and transitive. An infinite sequence s0, s1, . . . of elements of
S is called good if there are two indexes i < j such that si v sj . A qo (S,v) is called a well
quasi order (wqo) if all its sequences are good.
We prove (Ds,k,vkn) is a wqo for any intruder model, by showing a correspondence
between processes in Ds,k and finitely-labelled forests of height at most k, which we represent
as nested multisets. The details can be found in the Appendix D.
3.3 Limits and Ideal Decompositions
By exploiting the wqo structure of Ds,k, we can provide a finite representation for its
downward-closed sets. Let (S,v) be a qo. A set D ⊆ S is an ideal if it is downward-closed
and directed, i.e. for all x, y ∈ D there is a z ∈ D such that x v z and y v z. We write Idl(S)
for the set of ideals of S. It is well-known that in a well-quasi-order, every downward-closed
set is equal to a canonical minimal finite union of ideals, its ideal decomposition. To represent
downward-closed sets of Ds,k we will only need to provide finite representations of its ideals.
We represent ideals using limits, which have the same syntax as processes augmented with a
construct -ω to represent an arbitrary number of parallel components.
I Definition 17 (Limits). We call limits the terms L formed according to the grammar:
L 3 L ::= 0 | (R1 ‖ · · · ‖ Rn) R ::= B | Bω B ::= 〈M〉 | Q[ ~M ] | νx.L
I Definition 18 (Denotation of limits). The denotation of L is the set JLK := [L ]↓ where:
[0 ] := {0} [L1 ‖ L2 ] := {(P1 ‖ P2) | P1 ∈ [L1 ], P2 ∈ [L2 ]}
[Q[ ~M ] ] := {Q[ ~M ]} [Bω ] := ⋃n∈N {(P1 ‖ · · · ‖ Pn) | ∀i ≤ n : Pi ∈ [B ]}
[ 〈M〉 ] := {〈M〉} [ νx.L ] := {νx.P | P ∈ [L ]}
We call the processes in JLK instances of L. Define nestν(L) to be as nestν on processes with
the addition of the case nestν(Lω) := nestν(L). It is easy to check that for each P ∈ JLK,
depth(P ) ≤ nestν(L). We write LXs,k for the set of limit expressions L with free names in X
that have nestν(L) ≤ k and do not contain messages of size exceeding s. We often omit X
and understand it is a fixed finite set of names.
I Theorem 19. Limits faithfully represent ideals: I ∈ Idl(Ds,k) ⇐⇒ ∃L ∈ Ls,k : I = JLK.
3.4 Decidability of Inclusion
Now we turn to decidability of inclusion between downward-closed sets. It is well-known
that in a wqo, given the ideal decomposition of two downward-closed sets D1 = I1 ∪ . . . ∪ In
and D2 = J1 ∪ . . . ∪ Jm, we have D1 ⊆ D2 if and only if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is a
1 ≤ j ≤ m, such that Ii ⊆ Jj . Hence, decidability of ideals inclusion implies decidability of
downward-closed sets inclusion.
We extend structural congruence to limits in the obvious way, with the addition of the
law 〈M〉ω ≡ 〈M〉 obtaining that L ≡ L′ implies JLK = JL′K. We can define a standard form
for limits: every limit is structurally congruent to a limit of the form ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖∏i∈IQi[ ~Mi] ‖∏
j∈JB
ω
j ) where every name in ~x occurs free at least once in the scope of the restriction, and
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dLen :=

L if L is sequential or 0
dL1en ‖ dL2en if L = L1 ‖ L2
νx.(dL′en) if L = νx.L′
(dBen)n if L = Bω
L⊗ n :=

L if L is sequential or 0
L1 ⊗ n ‖ L2 ⊗ n if L = L1 ‖ L2
νx.(L′ ⊗ n) if L = νx.L′
(B ⊗ n)n ‖ Bω if L = Bω
Figure 4 The grounding d-en : Ls,k → Ds,k and extension -⊗n : Ls,k → Ls,k operations on limits.
for all j ∈ J , Bj is also in standard form. When we write sf(L) α= ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q ‖ R) we imply
that Q is a parallel composition of process calls
∏
i∈IQi[ ~Mi] (in which case we write |Q|
for |I|) and R is a parallel composition of iterated limits ∏j∈JBωj .
To better manipulate limits, we introduce, in Figure 4, the n-th grounding dLen and the
n-th extension L ⊗ n, of a limit L. Grounding replaces each -ω with -n, with the obvious
property that dLen ∈ JLK. An extension L⊗ n produces a new limit with each sub-limit Bω
unfolded n times. Note that extension does not alter semantics: JLK = JL⊗ nK.
The absorption axiom The decidability proof hinges on a characterisation of inclusion that
requires an additional hypothesis on the intruder model.
I Definition 20 (Absorbing intruder). Fix an intruder model I = (Σ,`). Let ~x and ~y
be two lists of pairwise distinct names, Γ be a finite set of messages, and Γ′ = Γ[~y/~x].
Moreover, assume that names(Γ) ∩ ~y = ∅. We say I is absorbing if, for all messages M with
names(M) ⊆ names(Γ), we have that Γ,Γ′ `M if and only if Γ `M .
I Lemma 21. Ien is absorbing.
For the rest of the paper, we assume an absorbing intruder model. The absorption axiom has
a technical definition, which becomes more intuitive if understood in the context of limits
of the form L =
(
ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q))ω. Imagine comparing the difference in knowledge between
dLe1 and dLe2: we have sf(dLe2) α= (ν~x.ν~x′.(〈Γ〉 ‖ 〈Γ′〉 ‖ Q ‖ Q′)), where Γ′ = Γ[~x′/~x]. The
absorption axiom tells us that if we want to check whether a process ν~x.〈M〉 is embedded
in sf(dLe2), we only need to check if M is derivable from Γ and we can ignore Γ′. In other
words, we only need to check if ν~x.〈M〉 is embedded in dLe1.
We are now ready to prove our main result: a small model property that shows decidability
of limit inclusion. Let us present the intuition on the simpler problem of deciding inclusion
when one of the limits is a single process P , i.e. deciding if P ∈ JLK. Take P = νa, b.(〈e(a)b〉 ‖
A[b]) and L =
(
νx.(〈x〉 ‖ A[x]))ω. Suppose we replicate the ω twice, obtaining the equivalent
limit L ⊗ 2 ≡ νx0, x1.(〈x0〉 ‖ A[x0] ‖ 〈x1〉 ‖ A[x1] ‖ L). The idea is that we can match P
against the fixed part of L⊗ 2:
P ≡kn νx0, x1.(〈e(x0)x1〉 ‖ A[x1 ]) vkn νx0, x1.(〈e(x0)x1〉 ‖ A[x0] ‖ A[x1])
vkn νx0, x1.(〈x0〉 ‖ 〈x1〉 ‖ A[x0] ‖ A[x1]) ∈ L⊗ 2
The first observation is therefore that if we can find some m such that P is embedded in the
fixed part of L⊗m, we have proven P ∈ JLK. To turn this into an algorithm, we need to prove
that there exists an n so that if we failed to embed P in the fixed part of L⊗m, for any m ≤ n
then P is not going to embed in L⊗m′ for every m′, and therefore P 6∈ JLK. In other words,
we need to know that after some threshold n, there is no point trying with bigger extensions.
Take for example P = νx, y.(B[x, y ]||B[y, x]) and L = (νx, y.B[x, y ])ω. We can try and embed
P into L⊗2 but we would fail as the fixed part expands to νx0, y0.B[x0, y0 ] ‖ νx1, y1.B[x1, y1 ].
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It is easy to see that expanding further would not introduce new patterns in the fixed part
of the limit which would help embed P .
Theorem 22 formalises the idea for general inclusion between two arbitrary limits L1
and L2: it proves that the threshold for expansion is the number of fixed restrictions of L1
plus the number of fixed process calls of L1, plus one; and it makes use of the absorption
axiom to prove the threshold is sound even in the presence of knowledge.
I Theorem 22 (Characterisation of Limits Inclusion). Let L1 and L2 be two limits, with
sf(L1)
α= ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1 ‖
∏
i∈IB
ω
i ), and let n = |~x1|+ |Q1|+ 1. Then:
JL1K ⊆ JL2K ⇐⇒ {sf(L2 ⊗ n) α= ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ Q2 ‖ R2) and Γ1 ≤kn Γ2 (A)J〈Γ1〉 ‖∏i∈IBiK ⊆ J〈Γ2〉 ‖ R2K (B)
I Theorem 23. Given L1, L2 ∈ L it is decidable whether JL1K ⊆ JL2K.
Proof. Theorem 22 leads to a recursive algorithm. Given L1 and L2, one computes sf(L1) and
sf(L2 ⊗ n). For every α-renaming that makes condition (A) hold, one checks condition (B)
(recursively). If no renaming makes both true then the inclusion does not hold. In the
recursive case, there are fewer occurrences of ω in the limit on the left, eventually leading to
the case where L1 has no occurrence of ω, and only condition (A) needs to be checked. J
I Example 24 (Limit inclusion). Consider the following two limits:
L1 = νx1.
(
(νx2.(〈e(x2)x1〉 ‖ A[x2 ] ‖ A[x1 ]))ω
)
L2 = νy1, y3.
(〈y3〉 ‖ A[y3 ]ω ‖ (νy2.(〈y2〉 ‖ A[y2 ]))ω)
We prove that JL1K ⊆ JL2K by applying the recursive algorithm from Theorem 23. By
Theorem 22, here the threshold for expansion is n = 2, but we will try with n = 1. In case
we succeed, the inclusion holds. If not, we might have to increase n up to 2. This results in
L2 ⊗ 1 = νy1, y3.
(〈y3〉 ‖ A[y3 ] ‖ A[y3 ]ω ‖ (νy2.(〈y2〉 ‖ A[y2 ]))ω ‖ (νy2.(〈y2〉 ‖ A[y2 ])))
≡kn νy1, y22, y3.
(〈y3〉 ‖ 〈y22〉 ‖ A[y22 ] ‖ A[y3 ] ‖ A[y3 ]ω ‖ (νy2.(〈y2〉 ‖ A[y2 ]))ω)
To try and match the fixed part of L1 with L2 ⊗ 1, we could α-rename x1 to y1. This works
for (A) but the remaining goal (B) cannot be shown as it does not hold because we cannot
derive 〈e(x2)y1〉 from the knowledge on the right-hand side:
Jνx2.(〈e(x2)y1〉 ‖ A[x2 ] ‖ A[x1 ])K 6⊆ J〈y3〉 ‖ 〈e(y22)y3〉 ‖ A[x1 ]ω ‖ (νy2.(〈e(y2)y3〉 ‖ A[y2 ]))ωK
Choosing the α-renaming [x1/y3 ] leaves us instead with:
Jνx2.(〈e(x2)y3〉 ‖ A[x2 ] ‖ A[x1 ])K ⊆ J〈y3〉 ‖ 〈e(y22)y3〉 ‖ A[x1 ]ω ‖ (νy2.(〈e(y2)y3〉 ‖ A[y2 ]))ωK
which holds. It suffices to expand the latter limit by 1 and to choose the renaming [x2/y2 ].
Then, e(x1)x2 ≤kn x1, x2 holds and the process calls match. Note that it is crucial to keep
A[x1 ]ω on the right side.
3.5 Computing Post-Hat
The last result we need is the decidability of a function p̂osts∆(L) which, given a limit L,
returns a finite set of limits {L1, . . . , Ln} such that posts∆(JLK)↓ = JL1K ∪ . . . ∪ JLnK. The
challenge is representing all the possible successors of processes in JLK without having to
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L = νa, b, kas, kbs.(〈a, b〉 ‖ A1[a, b, kas ]ω ‖ B1[a, b, kbs ]ω ‖ S[a, b, kas, kbs ]ω ‖ Lω1 )
L1 = νna.
(
〈na〉 ‖ A2[a, b, kas, na ] ‖ Lω2
)
L2 = νk.
(
〈e(k)(a,kas)〉 ‖ 〈e(k)(b,kas)〉 ‖ 〈e(k)(na,kas)〉 ‖ 〈e(k)kbs〉 ‖ Secret[k ]ω ‖ A3[a, b, kas, k ]ω ‖ Lω3
)
L3 = νnb.
(
〈e(nb)(k,k)〉 ‖ 〈e(nb)k〉 ‖ B2[a, b, kbs, nb, k ]
)
Figure 5 An inductive invariant for Example 9.
enumerate JLK. The key idea hinges again on the absorption axiom: we observe that to
consider all possible process calls that may cause a transition, it is enough to unfold each ω
in L by some bounded number b. Any transition taken from further unfoldings will give rise
to successors that are congruent to some of the ones already considered.
The bound b used in extending a limit, is defined as a function of the process definitions
and the intruder model. The arity of a pattern ~x : M is |~x|. Given a set of definitions ∆,
β(∆) is the maximum arity of patterns in ∆. The function γ(I) returns the maximum arity
of the constructors in the signature of I.
I Definition 25 (p̂ost). Let b = β(∆) · γ(I)s−1 + 1 and sf(L⊗ b) = ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q ‖ R),
p̂osts∆(L) :=
{
ν~y.
(〈Γ′〉 ‖ Q′ ‖ R) ∣∣ ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q)→∆ ν~y.(〈Γ′〉 ‖ Q′) ∈ Ss }.
I Theorem 26. p̂osts∆(L) = {L1, . . . , Ln} =⇒ posts∆(JLK)↓ = JL1K ∪ . . . ∪ JLnK.
3.6 Algorithmic Aspects
The limit L in Figure 5 represents an inductive invariant for Example 9, under size bound 3.
It can be proven invariant by checking that p̂ost3∆(L) is included in L. Since the initial
process of Example 9, P0, is in JLK, the invariant certificates that any reachable process is
(3, 7)-bounded (note nestν(L) = 7) and satisfies secrecy. In fact, Lω is also inductive, proving
boundedness and secrecy for any process in (P0)ω. Since Jνk.(νx.(〈x, e(x)k〉))ωK 6⊆ JLωK,
Lω provides proof that the protocol is not susceptible to known-plaintext attacks where
arbitrary known nonces are available to the intruder encrypted with the same key.2 The
algorithms for inclusion and p̂ost can be used to check inductiveness given a candidate
invariant such as L. This leaves open the question of how to efficiently generate candidates.
The algorithm of Theorem 16 can in principle be used to enumerate all candidate invariants,
with an impractically high complexity. Luckily, a more directed inference of invariants can be
obtained by a widening operator, in the style of [36]; in fact, the invariant L was automatically
inferred from P0 using the widening of our prototype tool. The basic observation behind
invariant inference, is that from a sequence of transitions P1 →∗ P2 with P1 vkn P2, one can
deduce that the same sequence can be simulated from P2 (by Theorem 8) obtaining a P3 with
P2 vkn P3 and so on. The embedding between P1 and P2, is justified by P1 ≡kn ν~x.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q),
P2 ≡kn ν~x.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q ‖ P ); we can extrapolate the difference P and accelerate the sequence of
transitions by constructing the limit ν~x.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q ‖ Pω). This operation can be extended to
limits. The end product is a finite union of limits which is inductive by construction. This
procedure requires exploration of transitions and many inclusion checks, a costly combination.
To obtain a more practical algorithm, we devised two techniques: inductiveness checks
through “incorporation”, and a coarser widening.
2 The property could be extended to cover composite known-plaintext messages (of some maximum size s),
and the generation of a sufficiently high number N of plaintext-encrypted pair with the same key.
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Table 1 Experimental results. Columns: Inference of invariant fully automatic (f) or interact-
ive (i); Check of inductiveness; Secrecy proved (X), not holding (×), not modelled (◦).
Name Infer C S Name Infer C S Name Infer C S
Ex.9 4.4s f 1.8s X NHS 5.0s f 1.6s ◦ YAH 7.8s f 2.5s ◦
OR 3.4s f 1.9s ◦ NHSs 6.8s f 1.7s X YAHs1 12.3s f 2.6s X
ORl 25.0s f 3.5s × NHSr 90.9s i 20.8s × YAHs2 8.8s f 2.0s X
ORa 13.8s i 5.0s ◦ KSL 37.0s f 9.8s X YAHlk 11.9s i 17.3s X
ORs 9.8s f 2.0s X KSLr 200.6s f 31.4s X ARPC 0.5s f 0.1s X
Consider the inductiveness check
q
p̂osts∆(L)
y ⊆ JLK implemented by checking that, for
each transition considered by p̂ost the resulting limit L′ is included by L. We observe that
L′ and L will share the context of the transition: L can be rewritten to C[Q[ ~M ]] and L′ to
C[P ] for some P . To prove inclusion of C[P ] in C[Q[ ~M ]] it is then sufficient to show that P
is embedded in C[Q[ ~M ]]. We call this check an incorporation of P in C. See Appendix K
for an example. Although incomplete in general, incorporation can prove inductiveness in
many practical examples, in a remarkably faster way.
There are cases, however, where the incorporation check fails on inductive invariants.
Consider for example an inductive invariant represented by the union of two incomparable
limits L1, L2. Suppose that for some P ∈ JL1K there is P ′ with P → P ′ ∈ JL2K \ JL1K. Then,
incorporation of P ′ in L1 would fail. To side-step this problem we replace union of limits
with parallel composition: JL1K ∪ JL2K ⊆ JL1 ‖ L2K by downward closure of J-K. Using this
over-approximation, we can try to aim for an inductive invariant which consists of exactly
one limit, and for which the incorporation check suffices. This approximation is incomplete:
some protocols require inductive invariants consisting of unions of incomparable limits.
4 Evaluation
We built a proof-of-concept tool implementing limit inclusion, inductivity check, incorporation
and a coarse widening. Currently, the tool only supports symmetric encryption, but we
plan to add support for asymmetric encryption, signatures and hashing. The source code
and all the test protocol models are available at [19] where we also provide a tutorial-style
explanation of the methodology. We summarise our experiments3 in Table 1. The tool
is instructed to compute, using the widening, an invariant for the provided model, under
given message size assumptions. When an invariant can be found, it represents a proof that
the model is depth-bounded. If the inferred invariant is leak-free, secrecy is also proven.
We model a number of well-known protocols under various threat scenarios (e.g. with or
without leak of old keys): Needham-Schröder (NHS), Otway-Rees (OR), Kehne-Schönwälder-
Landendörfer (KSL), Yahalom (YAH) and Andrew RPC (ARPC). For any example containing
a problematic encryption oracle pattern (see Example 15) we constrain the input message of
the oracle to be a nonce (message of size 1). With the exception of NHSr, ORa and YAHlk,
all the invariants were obtained fully automatically. For YAHlk we had to combine two
widened limits (the timing is the sum of the time spent computing each limit); for NHSr
and ORa we had to tweak a partially widened limit manually to make it inductive. To
simulate using invariants as correctness certificates, for each example we re-checked them for
inductiveness.
3 Tests run with Python 2.7, z3-solver v4.8, 8GB RAM, Intel CPU i5, on Linux.
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4.1 Limitations
Message size bounds Bounding message size in the analysis is not always acceptable, as it
may miss type confusion attacks. Such patterns arise, for example, in XOR-based protocols,
where considering only typed runs is not appropriate. This is problematic because in most
practical examples bigger size bounds lead to unboundedness in depth, as illustrated by
Example 15. However, not all is lost: our limits can be extended to provide invariants with
unbounded message size. The idea, detailed in Appendix I, is to first analyse a protocol
with a size bound that ensures depth-boundedness, obtaining an inductive invariant as one
or more limits; then we annotate such limits with “wildcards” (?) on occurrences of names.
A wildcarded name a? stands for an arbitrary message (of arbitrary size). By introducing
the appropriate wildcards, one can obtain an inductive invariant for the protocol with no
message size bounds. For Example 15, E[k ] ‖ (νx.〈e(x)k〉)ω is an inductive invariant if we
restrict x to be of size 1. Since x is never inspected , injecting larger terms in it would not
lead to new behaviour. We can therefore generalise the limit to E[k ] ‖ (νx.〈e(x?)k〉)ω which
is an inductive invariant for the protocol with no size bounds.
Since verification with no size bounds is undecidable, this extension is by necessity
incomplete: there are downward-closed sets that cannot be represented by extended limits.
However, since protocols typically achieve resistance to type confusion attacks by making
sure that messages of the wrong type are discarded by honest principals, this extension is very
effective. In fact, all the size bounds in our benchmarks can be lifted using this technique.
Inherent unboundedness There are two ways a protocol may fall outside of our class. The
first is when unboundedly many participants in a session form a ring/list topology, like
the recursive protocol of [29, §6]. One can provide a partial solution by using an under-
approximate model with a ring/list of fixed size, or an over-approximate model by using
an unbounded star topology. The second way is when the intruder can produce irreducible
encryption chains and the participants would inspect them generating new behaviour. In
such cases not even extended limits can help. We deem this situation unlikely to be desirable
in a realistic protocol.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented a theory of decidable inductive invariants for depth-bounded cryptographic
protocols. We showed how one can infer inductive invariants and evaluated the approach
through a prototype implementation.
From a theoretical perspective, it would be interesting to determine precise complexity
bounds for inclusion, for general intruder models. We can show that vkn is NP-complete for
any intruder model that has polynomially decidable ≤kn [32].
A direction for further improvement is extending the class of supported properties. In par-
ticular, we plan to study how invariants can be used to automatically prove diff-equivalence [5]
without bounding sessions/nonces.
Finally, we intend to explore ways in which our invariants can be integrated in existing
tools such as ProVerif and Tamarin. For instance, Tamarin performs a backwards search to
find possible attacks. Our invariants could provide a pruning technique to avoid exploring
paths that are unreachable from the initial state. Similar combinations of forward and
backward search have been shown to improve performance dramatically for analyses of
infinite-state systems such as Petri nets [7].
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 4
We check the model Σen is an effective intruder model. Rule Id implies (Id); it is easy to
check that any derivation for Γ `M is also a derivation (of same depth) for Γ,Γ′ `M , which
implies (Mon); (Cut) is a consequence of the admissibility of the cut rule proven in [33].
The –R rules directly entail (Constr). All rules are invariant under renamings so (Alpha)
holds. (Relevancy) can be proven by a straightforward induction on the depth of derivations.
Since the premises in every rule involve only sub-terms of the consequence, derivability is
decidable.
B Proof of Proposition 7
We want to prove P1 ≡kn P2 if and only if P1 vkn P2 and P2 vkn P1. The “only if” direction
is trivial. The “if” direction is proved as follows. Let sf(Pi)
α= ν~xi.(〈Γi〉 ‖ Qi) for i = 1, 2.
It is easy to check that P1 vkn P2 if and only if Γ1 ≤kn Γ2, ~x2 = ~x1~y2 for some ~y2, and
Q2 = Q1 ‖ Q′2 for some parallel composition of process calls Q′2. Similarly, P2 vkn P1 if and
only if Γ2 ≤kn Γ1, ~x1 = ~x2~y1, and Q1 = Q2 ‖ Q′1 for some ~y1, Q′1. We get Γ1 ∼kn Γ2, ~x1 = ~x2
and Q1 = Q2 as required to prove P1 ≡kn P2.
C Auxiliary Results
C.1 Properties of Knowledge
I Lemma 27. Let Γ1,Γ2,Γ ∈ K be such that Γ1 ≤kn Γ2. Then, Γ,Γ1 ≤kn Γ,Γ2.
Proof. Let Γ1 = {M1, . . . ,Mn}. We have to show that for all N , if Γ,Γ1 ` N then Γ,Γ2 ` N .
We apply (Cut) n times obtaining
Γ,Γ2 `M1
Γ,Γ2,M1 `M2
. .
.
Γ,Γ2, (Γ1 \Mn) `Mn Γ,Γ1,Γ2 ` N
...
Cut
Γ,Γ2,M1,M2 ` N
Cut
Γ,Γ2,M1 ` N
Cut
Γ,Γ2 ` N
Cut
From Γ1 ≤kn Γ2 we have ∀i ≤ n : Γ2 `Mi, which implies, by (Mon), all the left-most premises.
By (Mon), from Γ,Γ1 ` N we know Γ,Γ1,Γ2 ` N , which completes the derivation showing
Γ,Γ2 ` N . J
I Corollary 28. Let ∆1,∆2,Γ1,Γ2 ∈ K be such that ∆1 ≤kn ∆2 and Γ1 ≤kn Γ2. Then,
∆1,Γ1 ≤kn ∆2,Γ2.
Proof. Easy corollary of Lemma 27: Γ1,∆1 ≤kn Γ2,∆1 ≤kn Γ2,∆2. J
I Lemma 29. 〈Γ〉 ‖ 〈Γ〉 ≡kn 〈Γ〉, for all Γ ∈ K.
Proof. Let Γ ∈ K. By definition, 〈Γ〉 ‖ 〈Γ〉 ≡kn 〈Γ〉 iff Γ,Γ ∼kn Γ. Notice that these are
actually sets, hence Γ,Γ = Γ and the claim follows by reflexivity of ∼kn. J
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C.2 Properties of Knowledge Embedding
I Corollary 30. Let Γ ∈ K and P1, P2 ∈ P with sf(Pi) = ν~xi.(〈Γi〉 ‖ Qi) for i ∈ {1, 2} and
P1 vkn P2. Then, 〈Γ〉 ‖ P1 vkn 〈Γ〉 ‖ P2.
Proof. We only have to compare knowledge as Q1 vkn Q2 holds by assumption. Γ,Γ1 ≤kn
Γ,Γ2 follows by Lemma 27. J
I Lemma 31. Let P1, P2 ∈ P and n ∈ N. If P1 vkn P2, then Pn1 vkn Pn2 .
Proof. For every single instance of both processes use the matching provided by P1 vkn P2
for names and process calls. The knowledge embedding part of the goal can be obtained by
n applications of Corollary 28. J
C.3 Properties of Grounding
I Lemma 32. For every n ∈ N, dLen ∈ [L ].
I Lemma 33. For every n ≤ m ∈ N, dLen vkn dLem.
I Lemma 34. For every P ∈ JLK there exists an n ∈ N such that P vkn dLen.
Proof of Lemmas 32 to 34. All claims follow by an easy induction on the structure of L. J
I Lemma 35. For any L ∈ L, and m,n ∈ N, we have (dLωen)m vkn dLωem∗n.
Proof. We assume that n > 0 as the claim trivially holds if not.
(dLωen)m = ((dLen)n)m = (dLen)m∗n
dLωem∗n = (dLem∗n)m∗n
By Lemma 33, we know that dLem vkn dLem∗n as n > 0. The claim follows by Lemma 31. J
I Lemma 36. JL1K ⊆ JL2K ⇐⇒ ∀n ∈ N : ∃m ∈ N : dL1en vkn dL2em.
Proof. First, let n ∈ N. We compute the expansion dL1en ∈ JL1K by Lemma 32. By
assumption, dL1en ∈ JL2K and by Lemma 34 there exists an m such that dL1en vkn dL2em
as required. Second, let P ∈ JL1K. We need to show that P ∈ JL2K. By Lemma 34, there
exists an expansion for some n with P vkn dL1en. By assumption, there is an m such that
dL1en vkn dL2em. By transitivity of vkn, we know that P vkn dL2em which is in JL2K. By
downward closure, the claim follows. J
C.4 Properties of Extension
I Lemma 37. For every L ∈ L and n ∈ N, JLK = JL⊗ nK.
Proof. We prove the fact by two inclusions. The inclusion JLK ⊆ JL⊗ nK follows trivially by
definition. For the reverse inclusion, we apply Lemma 36. Given an arbitrary n′, we need
to show that there is m′ such that dL⊗ nen′ vkn dLem′ . It is straightforward to verify that
m′ = n · n′ suffices. J
I Lemma 38. For every L ∈ L and n ∈ N, dLen = dL⊗ ne0.
Proof. Straightforward induction on the structure of L. J
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D Soundness and Completeness of Limits
D.1 Depth-Bounded Processes are Well-Quasi-Ordered
Multisets Given a set X, the multisets over X, are all the functions µ : X → N such that
the set items(µ) := {(x, i) ∈ X × N | 0 < i ≤ µ(x)} is finite. We denote byM(X) the set of
all multisets over X. We write {|x1, . . . , xn|} for the multiset with elements x1, . . . , xn and
use ∅ for the empty multiset. The union two multisets µ1 ⊕ µ2 is the pointwise lifting of
addition. Assume (X,v) is a quasi order; its multiset extension is the quasi order vM over
M(X) defined as follows; for two multisets µ1, µ2 ∈ M(X), µ1 vM µ2 holds just if there
is an injective function f : items(µ1) → items(µ2) such that for each (x, i) ∈ items(µ1), if
f(x, i) = (y, j) then x v y. When X is a set ordered by equality, vM coincides with multiset
inclusion. If (X,v) is a wqo then (M(X),vM) is a wqo [21].
Forests We define a domain of forests FXs,k with sequential processes in Bs(X) as leaves:
Bs(X) := {Q[ ~M ] | Q ∈ Q, ar(Q) = | ~M |, ~M ⊆MXs } ∪MXs
FXs,0 :=M(Bs(X)) FXs,k+1 :=M
(
Bs(X) unionmulti FX∪{xk+1}s,k
)
(assuming xk+1 6∈ X)
The set Bs(X) contains all sequential processes of DXs,k. In the base case, forests of height 0,
FXs,0 is simply a multiset of sequential processes. Forests of height k + 1 are represented in
FXs,k+1 by a multiset of sequential processes and of subforests of height k.
For any given s ∈ N and finite X ⊆ N , Bs(X) is a finite set and thus forms a wqo with
equality. With vF (forest embedding) we denote the qo over FXs,k defined as follows: on FXs,0
it coincides with the multiset extension of equality on Bs(X); on FXs,k+1 it coincides with the
multiset extension of the disjoint union of equality on Bs(X), and the forest embedding on
FX∪{xk+1}s,k . By iterating the result on multisets, we obtain that for any s, k ∈ N and finite
X ⊆ N , (FXs,k,vF) is a wqo.
The function FJ-Kk, transforms a process P with nestν(P ) ≤ k into its forest encoding,
that is a forest that faithfully represents the structure of P .
I Definition 39 (Forest encoding). We define the function FJ-Kk which transforms a process P
with nestν(P ) ≤ k into a forest:
FJP Kk :=

∅ if P = 0
{|P |} if P is sequential
{|FJQ[xk/x]Kk−1|} if P = νx.Q
FJQ1Kk ⊕FJQ2Kk if P = Q1 ‖ Q2
assuming {x1, . . . , xk} ∩ (bn(P ) ∪ fn(P )) = ∅; when this assumption is not met because
of bound names, we implicitly α-rename the term before applying the definition. When
nestν(P ) > k, FJP Kk is undefined.
Figure 6 illustrates forest encodings. The forests in FYs,k have sequential processes as
leaves (with messages of size smaller than s), and free names Y unionmulti {x1, . . . , xk}. Lemma 12
allows us to use only k distinct bound names: this makes the forests finitely labelled.
I Lemma 40. If Q ∈ SYs and nestν(Q) ≤ k, then FJQKk ∈ FYs,k.
Proof. By easy induction on the structure of Q. J
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x2
x1
e(x1)k A[x2, x1 ]
B[x2,m] x1
C[x2, x1 ]
x2
e(x2)k
FJP K2 P = P1 ‖ P2 P1 = νa.(P3 ‖ B[a,m] ‖ P4)
P2 = νb.〈e(b)k〉 P3 = νc.(〈e(c)k〉 ‖ A[a, c])
P4 = νd.C[a, d] FJP K2 ∈ F{m,k}2,2
Figure 6 Forest encoding of P . Restrictions at nesting level k are renamed canonically to x2−k.
I Lemma 41. Assume Q1, Q2 ∈ SYs with nestν(Q1) ≤ k and nestν(Q2) ≤ k. Then
FJQ1Kk vF FJQ2Kk implies Q1 vkn Q2.
Proof. First we strengthen the statement: we can prove that if FJQ1Kk vF FJQ2Kk then
sf(Q1) = ν~y.R and sf(Q2) = ν~y.ν~z.(R ‖ R′), which clearly implies Q1 vkn Q2.
We proceed by induction on k. The base case is a special case of the induction step, so
let us consider the latter first. Assume nestν(Q1),nestν(Q2) ≤ k + 1 and ϕ1 = FJQ1Kk+1 vF
FJQ2Kk+1 = ϕ2, and let B = items(ϕ1) ∩ (BY (s) × N) and C = items(ϕ1) \ B (note that
C ⊆ (FY ∪{xk+1}s,k × N)). Then, by definition, there is an injective function f : items(ϕ1)→
items(ϕ2) such that for each (P, i) ∈ B, f(P, i) = (P, j) for some j; moreover, for each
(ϕ, i) ∈ C, if f(ϕ, i) = (ϕ′, j) then ϕ vF ϕ′. By definition of FJ-K we know that for
each (ϕ, i) ∈ C, there exist a subterm of Q1 α-equivalent to νxk+1.Pϕ for some Pϕ with
nestν(Pϕ) ≤ nestν(Q1)− 1 ≤ k and ϕ = FJPϕKk. Similarly for Q2, we have that if f(ϕ, i) =
(ϕ′, j) then there is a subterm of Q2 α-equivalent to νxk+1.Pf(ϕ,i) for some Pf(ϕ,i) with
FJPf(ϕ,i)Kk = ϕ′ and nestν(Pf(ϕ,i)) ≤ nestν(Q2)− 1 ≤ k.
We can therefore apply the induction hypothesis and get ϕ vF ϕ′ implies that sf(Pϕ) =
ν~yϕ.Rϕ and sf(Pf(ϕ,i)) = ν~yϕ.ν~zϕ.(Rϕ ‖ Rf(ϕ,i)). As a consequence we have
Q1 ≡kn
(∏
(P,i)∈BP ‖
∏
(ϕ,i)∈C(νxk+1.ν~yϕ.Rϕ)
)
Q2 ≡kn
(∏
(P,i)∈BP ‖
∏
(ϕ,i)∈C(νxk+1.ν~yϕ.ν~zϕ.(Rϕ ‖ Rf(ϕ,i))) ‖ R′
)
which clearly entails the claim, by application of α-renaming and scope extrusion to get the two
standard forms. In the base case, C = ∅ from which the claim follows straightforwardly. J
I Theorem 42. For every finite Y ⊆ N and s, k ∈ N, (DYs,k,vkn) is a wqo.
Proof. Let P1, P2, . . . be an infinite sequence of processes in DYs,k. By definition, for all
i ∈ N there exists a process Qi ∈ Ss such that Qi ≡kn Pi and nestν(Qi) ≤ k, which implies
by Lemma 40 that FJQiKk ∈ FYs,k. The sequence FJQ1Kk,FJQ2Kk, . . . must then be a good
sequence since (FYs,k,vF) is a wqo. Therefore, there are i, j ∈ N with i < j, such that
FJQiKk vF FJQjKk, which by Lemma 41 implies Qi vkn Qj . We therefore have Pi vkn Pj
which proves that the sequence P1, P2, . . . is good. J
D.2 Soundness and Completeness (Theorem 19)
We prove the two directions of Theorem 19 independently.
I Theorem 43. For every L ∈ Ls,k, the set JLK is an ideal of (Ds,k,vkn).
Proof. We want to prove that for every L ∈ Ls,k, we have JLK ⊆ Ds,k and JLK is vkn-down-
ward closed and directed.
Clearly JLK ⊆ Ds,k since every P ∈ [L ] has nestν(P ) ≤ nestν(L) ≤ k and its active
messages are the messages of L up to renaming (which does not alter size).JLK is downward closed by definition. Proving that JLK is directed requires showing that
for all P1, P2 ∈ JLK, there is Q ∈ JLK such that P1 vkn Q and P2 vkn Q. Such Q can be
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constructed by applying Lemma 34 to P1 and P2, obtaining n1 and n2 such that Pi vkn dLeni ,
for i = 1, 2. Then Q = dLemax(n1,n2) is the required process by Lemma 33. J
I Theorem 44. Every ideal in Idl(Ds,k) is the denotation of some limit L ∈ Ls,k.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to use the forest encoding FJ-K to apply known facts about
the ideal completion for multisets to our setting. We take an ideal of Ds,k and show it
corresponds to a downward closed set of Fs,k, via forest encoding. For multisets we know
exactly how to represent ideals [21], i.e. ~-products. These products are expressions that
can be readily seen as limits. Let us recall the result on multisets first and then proceed with
the proof.
Let X be a wqo with a finite representation of ideals I(X). Then we can finitely represent
ideals ofM(X) by expressions of the form
p = I~1  · · ·  I~n  J?1  · · ·  J?m
where Ii, Jj ∈ I(X) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. When n,m = 0 we write p = . Such
expressions are called ~-products. Their denotations are the ideals ofM(X), via the map
JK := {∅} Jp1  p2K := {µ1 ⊕ µ2 | µ1 ∈ Jp1K, µ2 ∈ Jp2K}JI~K :=M(JIK) JI?K := { {|x|} | x ∈ JIK } ∪ {∅}
In a wqo, downward closed sets are finite unions of ideals, so any downward closed set of
M(X) can be described as the union of the denotation of finitely many ~-products. For the
details4 see [21].
Another well-known property of ideals we are going to use is the following. Let D be a
downward closed set, then the following are equivalent:
(1) D is an ideal;
(2) for all downward closed sets D1, D2 ⊆ X,
if D ⊆ D1 ∪D2 then D ⊆ D1 or D ⊆ D2;
(3) for all downward closed sets D1, D2 ⊆ X,
if D = D1 ∪D2 then D = D1 or D = D2.
Now we turn to our theorem. Let D ⊆ Ds,k, we define
FJDKk := {FJP K | P ∈ D,nestν(P ) ≤ k}.
By definition, FJDKk ⊆ Fs,k.
We also define the opposite mapping, from forests to processes in the expected way. Let
ϕ ∈ FXs,k, B(ϕ) := supp(ϕ) ∩ Bs(X) and C(ϕ) := supp(ϕ) \B(ϕ). Then
PJϕKk := (∏P∈B(ϕ)Pϕ(P ) ‖∏ψ∈C(ϕ)(νxk.PJψKk−1)ϕ(ψ))
Since when k = 0, C(ϕ) = ∅, the expression is well-defined. We have PJϕKk ⊆ Ds,k and5
FqPJϕKkyk = ϕ and PqFJQKkyk ≡ Q (when defined).
I Lemma 45. For any vkn-downward closed D ⊆ Ds,k, FJDKk is vF-downward closed.
4 here we use a variation of ~-products that can be seen equivalent to the one in [21] by using (C1∪C2)~ =
C~1  C~2 .5 Note the implicit α-renaming in the application of FJ-K.
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Proof. First note that for each P ∈ D there is a Q ≡kn P in D such that FJQK ∈ FJDKk.
Towards a contradiction, assume there is a forest ϕ ∈ Fs,k such that there is a ψ ∈ FJDKk
with ϕ vF ψ but ϕ 6∈ FJDKk. We know that ψ = FJP Kk for some P ∈ D. From Lemma 41
we can derive that PJϕKk vkn P . But since D is downward closed, PJϕKk ∈ D, which
contradicts the assumption that ϕ 6∈ FJDKk. J
Proof of Theorem 44 We prove, by induction on k, that Idl(DXs,k) ⊆ JLs,kK. Again, the
base case is a special case of the induction step. Let k > 0 and D ∈ Idl(DXs,k); By induction
hypothesis, we can assume that the ideals of DXs,k−1 are described by limits in LXs,k−1. Since
D is downward closed, by Lemma 45, FJDKk ⊆ Fs,k is downward closed as well, and thus is
the finite union of some ideals of FXs,k. Now we have,
Idl
(
FXs,k
)
= Idl
(
M
(
Bs(X) unionmulti FX∪{xk+1}s,k
))
so we can represent Idl(FXs,k) with ~-products over Bs(X) unionmulti LX∪{xk+1}s,k . Let p1, . . . , pn be
such that
⋃n
i=1JpiK = FJDKk. From each pi we can obtain a limit Lpi by replacing:
1.  with ‖;
2. each B? with B and each B~ with Bω, if B ∈ Bs(X);
3. each L? with νxk.L and each L~ with (νxk.L)ω, if L ∈ LX∪{xk+1}s,k .
We now show that D =
⋃n
i=1JLpiK. It is important to remember that JpiK are vF-ideals
while JLpiK are vkn-ideals. One can show, by induction on the structure of pi, that Q ∈
[Lpi ] if and only if Q ≡ Q′ for some Q′ ∈ PJpiK. It then follows that JLpiK = {Q |
∃ϕ ∈ JpiK : Q vkn PJϕK} and therefore
D = {Q | ∃ϕ ∈ FJDK : Q vkn PJϕK}
=
n⋃
i=1
{Q | ∃ϕ ∈ JpiK : Q vkn PJϕK} = n⋃
i=1
JLpiK
We thus established that D =
⋃n
i=1JLpiK. Since D is an ideal and each JLpiK is downward
closed, we have that D = JLpj K for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n. J
E Proof of Absorption for Ien (Lemma 21)
Let ~x and ~y be two lists of pairwise distinct names, Γ ⊆ MΣen be a finite set of messages,
and Γ′ = Γ[~y/~x]. Moreover, assume that names(Γ) ∩ ~y = ∅. We have to show that, for all
messages M with names(M) ⊆ names(Γ), we have that Γ,Γ′ `M if and only if Γ `M .
The ⇐ direction is a direct consequence of (Mon). For the other direction, let σ = [~y/~x]
and σ′ = [~x/~y ], so Nσ′ ∈ Γ if and only if N ∈ Γ′. Note that Γσ′ = Γ′σ′ = Γ. Moreover, if
names(M) ⊆ names(Γ), M = Mσ′ because, by assumption, names(Γ) ∩ ~y = ∅.
We proceed by induction on the depth of the derivation for Γ,Γ′ `M . We assume the
statement holds for derivations of depth d and do a case analysis on the last rule applied in
the (d+ 1)-deep derivation for Γ,Γ′ `M .
Rule Id: M ∈ Γ ∪ Γ′. If M ∈ Γ we are done. Otherwise, if M ∈ Γ′, we have Mσ′ ∈ Γ but
M = Mσ′ so M ∈ Γ.
Rule PL: (N1, N2) ∈ Γ ∪ Γ′ and
Γ,Γ′, N1, N2 `M
Γ,Γ′ `M .
We then have two cases:
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Case (N1, N2) ∈ Γ. By (Mon) we can transform the d-deep derivation for Γ,Γ′, N1, N2 `M
into a derivation for Γ, N1, N2,Γ′, N1σ,N2σ `M of the same depth. Since M ⊆
names(Γ, N1, N2) = names(Γ) and by definition Γ′, N1σ,N2σ = (Γ, N1, N2)σ, we can
apply the induction hypothesis, obtaining Γ, N1, N2 ` M which proves Γ ` M by
application of Rule PL.
Case (N1, N2) ∈ Γ′. From Γ,Γ′, N1, N2 `M we get (Γ,Γ′, N1, N2)σ′ `Mσ′ by (Alpha).
Since we have Γσ′ = Γ′σ′ = Γ and Mσ′ = M , we can infer that Γ, N1σ′, N2σ′ ` M
which proves, together with (N1σ′, N2σ′) ∈ Γ, that Γ `M by application of Rule PL.
Rule SL: e(N)K ∈ Γ ∪ Γ′ and
Γ,Γ′ ` K Γ,Γ′, N,K `M
Γ,Γ′ `M .
We distinguish two cases:
Case e(N)K ∈ Γ. Then names(K) ⊆ names(Γ) and by induction hypothesis we have
Γ ` K. We also have names(N) ⊆ names(Γ), by definition (Γ, N,K)σ = Γ′, Nσ,Kσ
and names(M) ⊆ names(Γ, N,K). We can transform the d-deep derivation for
Γ,Γ′, N,K `M into a derivation for Γ, N,K,Γ′, Nσ,Kσ ` M with the same depth,
so by induction hypothesis we obtain Γ, N,K `M . By applying Rule SL to Γ ` K
and Γ, N,K `M we obtain Γ `M .
Case e(N)K ∈ Γ′. Then by (Alpha), Γ,Γ′ ` K implies Γσ′,Γ′σ′ ` Kσ′. Since Γσ′ = Γ
and Γ′σ′ = Γ we have Γ ` Kσ′. Similarly, Γ,Γ′, N,K `M implies Γ, Nσ′,Kσ′ `Mσ′.
Since Mσ′ = M , we have Γ, Nσ′,Kσ′ ` M , which in conjuction with Γ ` Kσ′ and
e(Nσ′)Kσ′ ∈ Γ, proves Γ `M by application of Rule SL.
Rule AL: Analogous to the case of Rule SL.
Rule PR: M = (N1, N2) and
Γ,Γ′ ` N1 Γ,Γ′ ` N2
Γ,Γ′ `M .
We have names(N1),names(N1) ⊆ names(Γ) so we can apply the induction hypothesis
to the two premises and get Γ ` N1 and Γ ` N2, which proves Γ `M by Rule PR.
Rule SR: Analogous to the case of Rule PR.
Rule AR: Analogous to the case of Rule PR. J
F Proof of Characterisation of Limits Inclusion
For any limit L with standard form ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q ‖∏i∈IBωi ), we call Γ and Q non-iterated,
also fixed, components while Bi for i ∈ I are iterated components.
We recall the statement: Let L1 and L2 be two limits, with sf(L1)
α= ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1 ‖∏
i∈IB
ω
i ), and let n = |~x1|+ |Q1|+ 1. Then:
JL1K ⊆ JL2K ⇐⇒ {sf(L2 ⊗ n) α= ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ Q2 ‖ R2) and Γ1 ≤kn Γ2 (A)J〈Γ1〉 ‖∏i∈IBiK ⊆ J〈Γ2〉 ‖ R2K (B)
F.1 Conditions (A) and (B) Are Sound for Inclusion
I Lemma 46 (Soundness). If conditions (A) and (B) hold, then JL1K ⊆ JL2K.
Proof. Given that (A) and (B) hold, it suffices to show that
∀n1 ∈ N,∃n2 ∈ N.dL1en1 vkn dL2 ⊗ nen2
by Lemmas 36 and 37. Let n1 be an arbitrary number. With R1 :=
∏
i∈IB
ω
i , we have
dsf(L1)en1 = ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ dR1en1) and sf(dL2⊗ne0) α= ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ Q2) by (A).
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We show that ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ dR1en1) vkn ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ Q2 ‖ dR2en2) for some n2.
Condition (A) induces a knowledge order for both fixed parts. Condition (B) gives rise to
some relation between the iterated components we will exploit. This relation is captured in
the following fact. For some α-renaming in (A) and some n2:
〈Γ1〉 ‖ dR1en1 vkn 〈Γ2〉 ‖ dR2en2 (∗)
Prior to proving (∗), we show that this fact and (A) suffice to prove our goal. With
sf(dRieni) = ν~yi.(ΓRni
i
‖ Q′i), we call ΓRni
i
the knowledge of dRieni for i ∈ {1, 2}. Because
of (∗), we can choose ~y2 so that ~y2 = ~y1, ~z2 and there is no need to rename for the
embedding anymore. Equipped with this abbreviation, the knowledge of the left hand side
(ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ dR1en1) is (Γ1,ΓRn11 ) while Γ2,ΓRn22 is the knowledge of the right hand
side ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ Q2 ‖ dR2en2). This is also exactly the knowledge contained in
(〈Γ1〉 ‖ dR1en1) respectively (〈Γ2〉 ‖ dR2en2), hence Γ1,ΓRn11 ≤kn Γ2,ΓRn22 by (∗). It remains
to take care of names and process calls for the embedding. Condition (A) already takes care
of non-iterated names and process calls. With our assumption (∗), we obtain
ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ 〈Γ1〉 ‖ dR1en1) vkn ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ Q2 ‖ 〈Γ2〉 ‖ dR2en2).
Both parts are knowledge congruent to our goal’s sides by Lemma 29 which proves the goal.
It remains to show that (∗), i.e. (〈Γ1〉 ‖ dR1en1) vkn (〈Γ2〉 ‖ dR2en2) for some n2. We
start with (B) and apply Lemma 36 so that we know that for every n1 ∈ N, there is a m ∈ N
such that 〈Γ1〉 ‖ d
∏
i∈IB1en1 vkn 〈Γ2〉 ‖ dR2em. By Lemma 31, we multiply on both sides:
(〈Γ1〉 ‖ d
∏
i∈IB1en1)n1 vkn (〈Γ2〉 ‖ dR2em)n1 .
By Lemma 29, we pull the messages out of both replications:
〈Γ1〉 ‖ (d
∏
i∈IB1en1)n1 vkn 〈Γ2〉 ‖ (dR2em)n1 .
We continue on both sides individually. On the left, we omit messages for simplicity as we
already know that Γ1 ≤kn Γ2.
(d∏i∈IB1en1)n1 = (∏i∈IdB1en1)n1 = dR1en1 .
While we use Lemma 35 and Corollary 30 on the right in order to obtain that:
〈Γ2〉 ‖ (dR2em)n1 vkn 〈Γ2〉 ‖ dR2en1·m
Combining both paths leads to: 〈Γ1〉 ‖ dR1en1 vkn 〈Γ2〉 ‖ dR2en1·m. By choosing n2 = n1 ·m,
the claim follows. J
F.2 Conditions (A) and (B) Are Complete for Inclusion
I Lemma 47 (Completeness). If JL1K ⊆ JL2K, then conditions (A) and (B) hold.
For this proof we are assuming the intruder model is absorbing. Before we give the proof,
we need some auxiliary definitions and results.
I Corollary 48. Let ~x and ~y be two lists of pairwise distinct names, Γ,Γ1 be two finite
sets of messages, and Γ2 = Γ1[~y/~x]. Moreover, assume that names(Γ1) ∩ ~y = ∅ and
names(Γ)∩~y = ∅ = names(Γ)∩~x. Then, for all messages M with names(M) ⊆ names(Γ,Γ1),
we have that Γ,Γ1,Γ2 `M if and only if Γ,Γ1 `M .
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Proof. The direction from right to left is obvious. For the reverse direction, it is equivalent to
show that Γ,Γ1,Γ,Γ2 `M . Now, Γ,Γ1 = (Γ,Γ2)[~y/~x]. The claim follows by the assumption
that the intruder is absorbing (Definition 20). J
I Lemma 49. Let L,L′ be two limits such that L ≡ L′. Then for every n ∈ N : dLen ≡ dL′en.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward structural induction on L. J
We introduce a refinement of grounding and a function folding the right hand side but
preserving the knowledge embedding. The (n, k,m)-th grounding takes a limit and unfolds
each ω n times for the outer k nested levels of ω, and m times for the inner ones.
I Definition 50 (Step-indexed grounding). For a limit L in standard form, we define the
(n, k,m)-th grounding of L to be the process dLen,k,m recursively:
dLen,k,m :=

L if L is sequential or 0
dL1en,k,m ‖ dL2en,k,m if L = L1 ‖ L2
νx.(dL′en,k,m) if L = νx.L′(dBen,k−1,m)n if L = Bω ∧ k > 0
(dBem)m if L = Bω ∧ k = 0
I Definition 51 (ω-height). For a limit L, we define the ω-height as follows:
ω-height(L) :=

0 if L is sequential or 0
max (ω-height(R1), · · · , ω-height(Rn)) if L = R1 ‖ · · · ‖ Rn
ω-height(L′) if L = νx.L′
ω-height(B) + 1 if L = Bω
I Lemma 52. Let L be a limit and m,n, k ∈ N. If k ≥ ω-height(L), then dLen,k,m = dLen.
Proof. The parameter k only decreases when recursing into a limit under ω. If k ≥
ω-height(L) the last case of the definition will never apply, which makes the definition
coincide with the one of n-grounding. J
The idea of the following parametrised function is to fold an m-grounding to an n-
grounding up to a certain ω-height k of the limit. Since we want to be very specific about
the domains, we define some sets of groundings.
I Definition 53 (Set of groundings). Let L ∈ L and m,n, k ∈ N.
We define the following two sets of processes:
RmL := {dsf(L)em}
Rn,k,mL := {dsf(L)en,k,m}
I Definition 54. Let L be a limit in recursive standard form and m, k, n ∈ N. The function
Φn,mk,L : RmL → Rn,k,mL and is parametrised in all four variables.
Φn,mk,P (P ) :=

P if k = 0
ν~x.
(
〈Γ〉 ‖ Q ‖∏j∈J(Φn,mk,Lj (dLωj em))) if k > 0 ∧ P = ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q ‖∏j∈JLωj )(
Φn,mk−1,L(dLem)
)n
if k > 0 ∧ P = dLωem
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We may omit the parameters n and m in the following if obvious from context as they do
not change over the process of folding.
I Lemma 55 (Folding is sound wrt. knowledge embedding). Let L1, L2 be two limits in
standard form Li = ν~xi.(〈Γi〉 ‖ Qi ‖ Ri) with n = | ~x1|+ |Q1|+ 1. If there is a m ∈ N such
that m > n and dL1e0 vkn dL2em, then ∀k : dL1e0 vkn Φn,mk,L2(dL2em).
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on k.
For k = 0, the claim trivially follows as Φn,m0,L2(dL2em) = dL2em by the assumption that
dL1e0 vkn dL2em holds.
For the induction step, we assume that dL1e0 vkn Φn,mk,L2(dL2em) and prove
dL1e0 vkn Φn,mk+1,L2(dL2em).
By definition of folding, both Φk,L(dL2em) and Φk+1,L(dL2em) are folding in exactly the
same way up to the k-th recursive calls, i.e. calls in which k decreases. This means that up to
the calls to Φ0,L′ and Φ1,L′ , both Φk,L(dL2em) and Φk+1,L(dL2em) will have constructed the
same context C[−, · · · ,−] around these final calls. We thus characterise A = Φn,mk,L2(dL2em),
and B = Φn,mk+1,L2(dL2em) as follows:
A = C[Φn,m0,Fω1 (F
ω
1 ), · · · ,Φn,m0,Fω
j
(Fωj )]
= C[dFω1 em, · · · , dFωj em] = C[(dF1em)m, · · · , (dFjem)m]
B = C[Φn,m1,Fω1 (F
ω
1 ), · · · ,Φn,m1,Fω
j
(Fωj )] = C[(dF1em)n, · · · , (dFjem)n]
Recall that L1 = ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ R1) and hence dL1e0 = ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1). By assumption,
we have
ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1) vkn Φn,mk,L2(dL2em) = A (1)
and want to prove that
ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1) vkn Φn,mk+1,L2(dL2em) = B. (2)
Intuitively, we have to find a way to preserve the knowledge embedding from (1) when
removing some branches in the holes of the context to get from A to B. Let us show what A
and B look like explicitly with their context:
A ≡ ν~c.(〈Γc〉 ‖ Qc ‖ D) with D = (dF1em)m ‖ · · · ‖ (dFjem)m
B ≡ ν~c.(〈Γc〉 ‖ Qc ‖ E) with E = (dF1em)n ‖ · · · ‖ (dFjem)n
We call Γc the knowledge of the context.
Our goal is to show that reducing the number of iterations in each of D’s parallel
components does not affect the knowledge embedding described in (i) and thereby obtain
(ii). Let us first consider names and process calls. We can split dL1e0 in the following way:
dL1e0 = ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1) = ν~y.ν~z.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Qy ‖ Qz) where ~y ⊆ ~c and Qy ⊆ Qc . The intention
is to distinguish names and process calls that are already matched in the context. This is
why we do not require all process calls that are only using names from ~y to be in Qy but
some of them might be in Qz. The goal follows with the following claim immediately.
Claim I: In every hole of context C[−, · · · ,−], we can reduce the number of branches to
at most n, i.e. for every 1 ≤ l ≤ j we can have a grounding dFlen instead of dFjem.
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Proof of Claim I. Towards a contradiction, assume that there is a hole in which we cannot
remove m− n branches. W.l.o.g. let dLlem for 1 ≤ l ≤ j be the sublimit in this hole. There
might be three reasons for this: names, process calls and knowledge.
Considering the names and process calls, we know that | ~x1|+ |Q1| < n by definition and
hence |~z|+ |Qz| < n. Now, we investigate the components that ~z and Qz are matched to.
In the worst case, all of them are mapped to this hole but we still delete m−n branches that
are not used to match the names ~z. For the process calls in Qz, we have to distinguish two
cases. First, if a process call uses any name from ~z, it is fine as we will leave them anyway.
Second, if a process call does not use any name from ~z, it is fine to delete this branch as
there will be enough copies in the remaining branches to cover this process call.
It remains to reason about knowledge. We make the knowledge of D, i.e. the one having
budget k, explicit: sf(D) = ν~a.(Γm ‖ · · · ) and factor out the knowledge from sublimit dFlem:
Γm = Γ′m,Γl,m so that Γl,m was the knowledge obtained through dFlem. For knowledge,
we have to prove that Γ1 ≤kn Γc,Γ′m,Γl,n. By Proposition 2, we need to prove that for
every message M ∈ Γ1, Γc,Γ′m,Γl,n ` M given that Γc,Γ′m,Γl,m ` M . The idea now is
to reduce the knowledge from Γl,m to Γl,n by Corollary 48, which is a corollary of the
absorbing intruder. Let us define Γ′c,m = Γc,Γ′m indicating the context of the hole we are
considering. As m might be bigger than 2n, we have to iterate the process of reducing the
number of branches. Hence, we generalise the notation of Γl,m and Γl,n in the following way:
(dFlem)i ≡ ν~ai.(〈Γl,i〉 ‖ · · · ).
Claim II: ∀m > n, Γl,m `M =⇒ Γl,m−1 `M .
Proof of Claim II. For convenience, we rename Γl,i to Λi. The main observation is that
we can split the knowledge Λm into Λm−1 and a remainder Λ′. We can choose a branch
which does not use names from ~z to contribute to Λ′. Since we know that n ≥ 1, we know
that m > 1 by assumption. Therefore, we can split Λm−1 again and obtain the knowledge
stemming from one branch which we call Λ′′. Let us recall the assumption and goal after
these rewriting steps: Given that
Γ′c,m,Λm−2,Λ′,Λ′′ `M (3)
holds, we want to prove that Γ′c,m,Λm−2,Λ′′ `M . Let ~w′ and ~w′′ be the names only used in
Λ′ and Λ′′ respectively so that:
~w′ ∩ ~w′′ = ∅ and names(Γ′c,m,Λm−2) ∩ ~w′ = ∅ = names(Γ′c,m,Λm−2) ∩ ~w′′ (4)
Λ′ and Λ′′ have been obtained from a branch of the same sublimit, so we can infer that
Λ′′ = Λ′[ ~w′′/~w′ ]. (5)
Notice that ~w′ ∩ ~z = ∅ by the fact how we have chosen the branch for Λ′. Furthermore,
~w′ ∩ ~y = ∅ by ~y ⊆ ~c. Combining these observations, we get that ~x1 ∩ ~w′ = ∅. By the fact
that M ∈ Γ1, we have names(M) ⊆ names(Γ1) ⊆ ~x1. Therefore, names(M) ∩ ~w′ = ∅ which
implies that
names(M) ⊆ names(Γ′c,m,Λm−2,Λ′′) (6)
Facts (3) to (6) fulfil the conditions for Corollary 48, resulting in Γ′c,m,Λm−2,Λ′′ `M which
reads Γ′c,m,Λm−1 ` M when folding back which is the goal of Claim II. By this, we have
shown that we can remove m−n branches which leads to a contradiction which is why Claim
I holds. As dFlem was chosen arbitrarily, we have shown that we can remove m− n branches
in every hole of the context C[−, · · · ,−] which concludes this proof. J
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I Corollary 56. Let L1, L2 be two limits with sf(L1) = ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ R1) and JL1K ⊆ JL2K.
Then, sf(L2 ⊗ n) α= ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ Q2 ‖ R2) and Γ1 ≤kn Γ2. for n = |~x1|+ |Q1|+ 1.
Proof. First, we show that dsf(L1)e0 vkn dL2en. By JL1K ⊆ JL2K, we know that there
is an m so that dsf(L1)e0 vkn dL2em by Lemma 36. From Lemma 55, we obtain that
that dsf(L1)e0 vkn Φn,mk,L2(dL2em) for every k. Substituting ω-height(L2) for k leads to
Φn,mω-height,L2(dL2em). This is dL2en by Lemma 52. Using this knowledge embedding, we
get dL2en α= ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ Q2) with Γ1 ≤kn Γ2. With Lemma 38, we observe that
dL2en = dL2 ⊗ ne0. By this, the claim follows as d−e0 just omits the iterated parts, i.e. R2,
from sf(L2 ⊗ n). J
I Lemma 57 (Necessary Conditions for Inclusion). Let L1 and L2 be two limits, with sf(L1) α=
ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ R1) with R1 =
∏
i∈IB
ω
i , and let n = |~x1|+ |Q1|+1. Given that the inclusionJL1K ⊆ JL2K, both conditions (A) and (B) hold.
Proof. For (A), the claim follows by Corollary 56 which implicitly gives a renaming for L2.
For (B), we want to show that J〈Γ1〉 ‖∏i∈IBiK ⊆ J〈Γ2〉 ‖ R2K.
Let Ni = 〈Γi〉 ‖ Ri. It is straightforward to see that J〈Γ1〉 ‖∏i∈IBK ⊆ JN1K. This is why it
is enough to show that JN1K ⊆ JN2K by transitivity.
Towards a contradiction, we assume that for all possible renaming so that (A) is satisfied,JN1K 6⊆ JN2K. By Lemma 36,
∃m′1,∀m1 ≥ m′1,∀m2.dN1em1 6vkn dN2em2 . (7)
First, knowledge could break the embedding. Let us define
sf(dNiemi) = νyi.(Γi ‖ Γ′i ‖ Q′i).
Notice that names(Γi) ∩ ~yi = ∅. There might be two reasons why the knowledge embedding
does not hold.
First, the embedding breaks because of knowledge. This is impossible as Γ1,Γ′1 and
Γ2,Γ′2 represent the knowledge of groundings of the two limits L1 and L2 as their top level
knowledge is replicated in (B). Therefore, the inclusion JL1K ⊆ JL2K would also break which
is a contradiction.
Second, names or process calls can hence be the only reasons why the knowledge embedding
dN1em′1 vkn dN2em2 does not hold for any m2. We will derive a contradiction by choosing
n1 = 2 ·max(|~x2|+ |Q2|+1,m′1). We incorporate dR1en1 into sf(L1): dsf(L1)en1 = ν~x1.(Γ1 ‖
Q1 ‖ dR1en1). Recall that dsf(L2 ⊗ n)em2 α= ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ Q2 ‖ dR2em2). By the size
of n1, at least half of the names and process calls of dR1en1 have to be covered by dR2em2
as the non-iterated part ~x2 and Q2 cannot do more than half. But by definition n12 ≥ m′1 so
∀m2, dR1e
n1
2 6vkn dR2em2 as knowledge cannot be the reason for (7) to break. Altogether,
this entails that there is a n1 such that for all m2:
dsf(L1)en1 = ν~x1.(Γ1 ‖ Q1 ‖ dR1en1)
6vkn ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1 ‖ Q2 ‖ dR2em2) α= dsf(L2 ⊗ n)em2
Using Lemma 37, this implies that dL1en1 6vkn dL2em2 for every m2. In turn, this entails
that JL1K 6⊆ JL2K by Lemma 36 which is a contradiction. J
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G Correctness of p̂ost
I Definition 58 (β(∆) and b). Let ∆ be a set of definitions. We define β(∆) and γ(I) as
follows:
β(∆) := max{ |~x| | (Q[~y ] := A+ in(~x : M).P +A′) ∈ ∆ }
γ(I) := max{ ar(f) | f ∈ Σ) } with I = (Σ,`)
then b := β(∆) · γ(I)s−1 + 1.
Recall the definition of p̂ost from Definition 25. Let sf(L⊗ b) = ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q ‖ R), then
p̂osts∆(L) :=
{
ν~y.
(〈Γ′〉 ‖ Q′ ‖ R) ∣∣ ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q)→∆ ν~y.(〈Γ′〉 ‖ Q′) ∈ Ss }
I Corollary 59 (Post of expansion is enough). Let L be a limit and P ∈ JLK. Then, for every
P1 ∈ post(P ), there is a P2 ∈ post(dLen) for some n ∈ N such that P1 vkn P2.
Proof. As P ∈ JLK, we know that there is a n′ ∈ N such that P vkn dLen′ by Lemma 34.
We choose this n′ to be n. We have that P → P1 and P vkn dLen. As vkn is a simulation
(Theorem 8), we know that there is a P2 so that dLen → P2 and P1 vkn P2. J
Let us recall the theorem we want to prove: for all L ∈ Ls,k,
p̂osts∆(L) = {L1, . . . , Ln} =⇒
(
post(JLK) ∩ Ss)↓ = JL1K ∪ . . . ∪ JLnK.
Proof of Theorem 26. We assume that p̂osts∆(L) = {L1, . . . , Ln} and prove the set equality
by inclusion in both directions.
First, we show that
(
post(JLK) ∩ Ss)↓ ⊇ JL1K ∪ . . . ∪ JLnK. It suffices to show thatJLjK ⊆ (post(JLK) ∩ Ss)↓ for every j ∈ {1, · · · , n}. We choose j arbitrarily and prove the
latter statement. By definition, we know that Lj stems from at least one transition in
the non-iterated part of sf(L ⊗ b) = ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q ‖ R). Wlog let P1 := ν~x.
(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q) →∆
ν~y.
(〈Γ′〉 ‖ Q′) =: P2 be this transition in Ss. Hence, Lj = ν~y.(〈Γ′〉 ‖ Q′ ‖ R). By Lemma 37,JLK = JL ⊗ bK and therefore dν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q ‖ R)en = ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q ‖ dRen) ∈ JLK for every n.
Because of P1 → P2, we know that dν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q ‖ R)en → dν~y.(〈Γ′〉 ‖ Q′ ‖ R)en. This is
why dLjen = dν~y.(〈Γ′〉 ‖ Q′ ‖ R)en ∈ post(JLK) for every n. With Lemma 34, we know that
for every P ∈ JLjK, there is a m so that P vkn dLjem. By downward-closure, we infer that
P ∈ (Jpost(L)K ∩ Ss)↓.
Second, we show that
(
post(JLK) ∩ Ss)↓ ⊆ JL1K∪ . . .∪ JLnK. Let dLeb has standard form:
sf(dLeb) α= ν~x1.(Γ1 ‖ Q[ ~M ] ‖ C1). By Corollary 59, it suffices to consider only successors of
groundings of L. Therefore, let b < m ∈ N with sf(dLem) α= ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ 〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q[ ~M ] ‖
C2). We consider the three different reduction rules that can be fired starting from this
grounding:
a principal is waiting for some message on a private channel which is derivable and the
pattern can be matched by Γ
a principal would like to send a message on some private channel which can be derived
from the environment
one principal sends a message on a private channel to another principal
We split the parts into three paragraphs.
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Public private channel, message input We have Q[ ~M ] := a(~p : N).P1 +A for some private
channel a and action A. Wlog we derive the message which is matched using some fresh
intruder names ~c: Γ1,~c ` N [ ~M ′/~x] and the channel name a can be derived by assumption:
Γ1,Γ2 ` a. Overall, we get the following transition:
dLem Q[ ~M ]=a(~p:N).P1+A−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
~p→ ~M ′
ν~x1, ~x2,~c.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ 〈Γ2〉 ‖ 〈~c〉 ‖ P1[ ~M ′/~p] ‖ C2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′∈posts(L)
where the annotations explicitly state which process call and action was used with which
substitution. We want to show that we can have the same reduction in dLeb. We do so by
using the Φ function as in Lemma 55 to relate the difference between iterating k times and
k + 1 times.
Claim I: For every k ∈ N, ∃~yk,∆k, Dk such that
Φb,nk,L(dLen)
Q[ ~M ]=a(~p:N).P1+A−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
~p→ ~M ′
ν~yk,~c.(〈∆k〉 ‖ 〈~c〉 ‖ P1[ ~M ′/~p] ‖ Dk) (8)
with ∆k,~c ` N [ ~M ′/~p] and ∆k,~c ` a.
Proof of Claim I by induction on k: For the base case in which k = 0, the claim holds by
assumption. For the induction step, we assume that (8) holds for k and we prove it for k+ 1.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 55, we use a multi-hole context C[−, · · · ,−] to distinguish
between having budget k or k + 1. Let F1, · · · , Fj be j limits and C[−, · · · ,−] a multi-hole
context so that:
Φb,nk,L(dLen) ≡ C[Φb,n0,Fω1 (F
ω
1 ), · · · ,Φb,n0,Fω
j
(Fωj )] = C[dFω1 en, · · · , dFωj en]
= C[(dF1en)n, · · · , (dFjen)n] = A
Φb,nk+1,L(dLen) ≡ C[Φb,n1,Fω1 (F
ω
1 ), · · · ,Φb,n1,Fω
j
(Fωj )]
= C[(dF1en)b, · · · , (dFjen)b] = B
We want to show that it suffices to have b copies of Fl for any 1 ≤ l ≤ j. Since Q[ ~M ] also
occurs in sf(dLeb), it is trivial to keep the process call which is reduced. It remains to argue
that the same redex is enabled in B. Towards a contradiction: Assume that there is a hole in
which b copies are not sufficient. Wlog let Ll be the limit in this hole.
We did not explicitly single out the message N [ ~M ′/~p] but only the substitution [ ~M ′/~p]
for the continuation since the substitution is solely determining the successor.
We know that A’s knowledge is ∆k and factor out the knowledge from sublimit dFlem:
∆k = ∆′k,∆l,m so that ∆l,m was the knowledge obtained through dFlem. We want to prove
that ∆′k,∆l,m,~c ` N [ ~M ′/~p] =⇒ ∆′k,∆l,b,~c ` N [ ~M ′/~p] where ∆l,b denotes the knowledge
obtained through dFleb respectively.
Now, we consider the different names used in N [ ~M ′/~p]. It is straightforward to see that
names(N) ⊆ ~x1. Recall the definition of b:
b := β(∆) · γ(I)s−1 + 1
By this, we know that β(∆) ≥ |~p| and hence b ≥ |~p| · γ(I)s−1 + 1. Intuitively, this ensures
that there are enough distinct names for every single parameter in the parameter list as well
as for channel a as the size determines the maximum depth of the syntax tree of a message.
As names(~p) < b, we can remove at least m− b branches without loosing names used in ~p
or channel name a. Therefore, we can assume that names(N [ ~M/~p]) ∪ {a} ⊆ ~x1. The idea
E. D’Osualdo and F. Stutz 33
is to reduce the knowledge from ∆l,m to ∆l,b by Corollary 48, which is a corollary of the
absorbing intruder. As m might be bigger than 2b, we have to iterate the process of reducing
the number of branches. Hence, we generalise the notation of ∆l,m and ∆l,b in the obvious
way: (dFlem)i ≡ ν~ai.(∆l,i ‖ · · · ).
Claim II: For all m > b,(
∆l,m ` N [ ~M/~p] ∧ ∆l,m ` a
)
=⇒ (∆l,m−1 ` N [ ~M/~p] ∧ ∆l,m−1 ` a).
Proof of Claim II. For convenience, we rename ∆l,i to Λi. The main observation is that
we can split the knowledge Λm into Λm−1 and a remainder Λ′. We can choose a branch
which does not use names from ~x1 to contribute to Λ′. Since we know that n ≥ 1, we know
that m > 1 by assumption. Therefore, we can split Λm−1 again and obtain the knowledge
stemming from one branch which we call Λ′′. Let us recall the assumption and goal after
these rewriting steps: Given that
∆′k,Λm−2,Λ′,Λ′′ ` N [ ~M/~p] and ∆′k,Λm−2,Λ′,Λ′′ ` a (9)
holds, we want to prove that ∆′k,Λm−2,Λ′′ ` N [ ~M/~p] and ∆′k,Λm−2,Λ′′ ` a. Let ~w′ and
~w′′ be the names only used in Λ′ and Λ′′ respectively so that:
~w′ ∩ ~w′′ = ∅ and names(Γ′c,m,Λm−2) ∩ ~w′ = ∅ = names(Γ′c,m,Λm−2) ∩ ~w′′ (10)
Λ′ and Λ′′ have been obtained from a branch of the same sublimit, so we can infer that
Λ′′ = Λ′[ ~w′′/~w′ ]. (11)
Notice that ~w′ ∩ ~x1 = ∅ by the fact how we have chosen the the branch for Λ′. Because
of names(N [ ~M/~p]) ∪ {a} ⊆ ~x1, we can infer that (names(N [ ~M/~p]) ∪ {a}) ∩ ~w′ = ∅ which
implies that
names(N [ ~M/~p]) ∪ {a} ⊆ names(∆′k,Λm−2,Λ′′) (12)
Facts (9) to (12) fulfil the conditions for Corollary 48 resulting in ∆′k,Λm−2,Λ′′ ` N [ ~M/~p]
and ∆′k,Λm−2,Λ′′ ` a which reads ∆′k,Λm−1 ` N [ ~M/~p] and ∆′k,Λm−1 ` a respectively when
folding back which is the goal of Claim II.
In turn, this concludes the proof of Claim I.
Instantiating the statement of Claim I with k > ω-height(L) shows that this transition is
still enabled in dLeb. We prove that the same holds for transitions enabled by the remaining
reduction rules.
Public private channel, message output Recall that sf(dLem) α= ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ 〈Γ2〉 ‖
Q[ ~M ] ‖ C2). We have Q[ ~M ] := a〈M〉.P1 + A for some private channel a and action A.
The channel name a can be derived by assumption: Γ1 ` a. Overall, we get the following
transition:
dLem Q[ ~M ]=a〈M〉.P1+A−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ν~x1, ~x2,~c.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ 〈Γ2〉 ‖ 〈M〉 ‖ P1 ‖ C1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′∈posts(L)
and the channel name a can be derived by assumption: Γ1,Γ2 ` a. We want to show
that we can have the same reduction in dLeb. We sketch the proof that this transition is still
enabled as it is analogous to the first proof. We start with an analogous claim.
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Claim I: In every hole of context C[−, · · · ,−], we can reduce the number of branches to
at most n, i.e. for every j we can have a grounding dFjen instead of dFjem. for every k ∈ N:
∃~yk,∆k, Dk : Φb,nk,L(dLen)
Q[ ~M ]=a〈M〉+A−−−−−−−−−−→ ν~yk.(〈∆k〉 ‖ P1 ‖ 〈M〉 ‖ Dk)
with ∆k ` a
It is obvious to see that the side condition is subsumed by (8) which we have used in the
first case and hence the proof could be proceeded in the same way.
Private channel, two participants For the last case, we consider:
sf(dLem) α= ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ 〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1[ ~M1] ‖ Q2[ ~M2] ‖ C2) with
Q1[ ~M1] , c〈N [ ~M ′/~x]〉.P1 +A1
Q2[ ~M2] , c(~x : N).P2 +A2
The resulting transition looks as follows:
ν ~x1.ν ~x2(〈Γ1〉 ‖ 〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q1[ ~M1] ‖ Q2[ ~M2] ‖ C2)
→∆ ν ~x1. ~x2(〈Γ1〉 ‖ 〈Γ2〉 ‖ P1 ‖ P2[ ~M ′/~x] ‖ C2)
There are no side conditions on derivability in this case so we only have to ensure that all
possible combiniations of c〈N [ ~M ′/~x]〉.P1 and c(~x : N).P2 can occur. As both actions could
stem from the same process call, it suffices to have an expansion factor greater or equal
to 2. This only poses restrictions on β and γ. By definition of b, we need to ensure that
β(∆) · γ(I)s−1 ≥ 1. As argued before, considering s < 2 is unreasonable since it would be
impossible to have encryptions in this setting. Hence, even if γ(I) was 0, γ(I)s−1 ≥ 1 for
reasonable s. If β(∆) < 1, it is 0 and hence the transition we consider would be impossible.
We therefore can assume that β(∆) > 0. Hence, we know that b ≥ 2 and this suffices to have
a congruent transition in dLeb.
We now turn back to our general goal and know that all kinds of transitions are enabled
in dLeb. Consider the extension L⊗ b of limit L whose standard form we choose to resemble
the correlation with dLeb: sf(L ⊗ b) α= ν~x1.(Γ1 ‖ Q[ ~M ] ‖ C1 ‖ R1). By the definition of
p̂ost(L), we know that
L′ := ν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ P1[ ~M/~p] ‖ C1 ‖ R1) ∈ p̂ost(L).
Recall that Q′ = ν~x1, ~x2,~c.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ 〈Γ2〉 ‖ 〈~c〉 ‖ P1[ ~M ′/~p] ‖ C1) was the successor of dLem
from the beginning. It remains to show that Q′ ∈ JL′K. As before for L⊗ b, we relate the
standard form of L⊗m to dLem and get the following:
sf(L⊗m) α= ν~x1, ~x2.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ 〈Γ2〉 ‖ Q[ ~M ] ‖ C2 ‖ R2)
By Lemma 37, we have that JL⊗mK = JL⊗ bK and taking one step hence leads to
K ′ := Jν~x1, ~x2,~c.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ 〈Γ2〉 ‖ 〈~c〉 ‖ P1[ ~M ′/~p] ‖ C2 ‖ R2K
= Jν~x1.(〈Γ1〉 ‖ 〈~c〉 ‖ P1[ ~M ′/~p] ‖ C1 ‖ R1)K =: L′
As Q′ ∈ K ′, it also holds that Q′ ∈ L′ which concludes this proof.
J
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H Support for Other Cryptographic Primitives
We claim the assumptions we make on the intruder model are mild, and are satisfied by
the symbolic models of many cryptographic primitives. We illustrated the treatment of
(a)symmetric encryption; treatment of hashes and blind signatures is entirely analogous. By
using the sequent calculus formalisation of [33] one can trivially extend our proofs to prove
all these primitives form an effective absorbing intruder.
Supporting XOR requires a bit more analysis on the algebraic properties of the primitives.
We take as reference the model of XOR analysed in [1, 12]. The two constructors ⊕ (of
arity 2) and 0 (of arity 0) are added to the set of constructors. Their algebraic properties
are formalised through a congruence relation:
M1 ⊕ (M2 ⊕M3) ∼= (M1 ⊕M2)⊕M3 M1 ⊕M2 ∼= M2 ⊕M1 (13)
M ⊕ 0 ∼= M M ⊕M ∼= 0 (14)
The results of [1, 12] establish that the laws (14) can be always orientated from left
to right. Formally, one can define the rewriting system  with two rules M ⊕ 0  
M and M ⊕M  0; and the congruence ∼=AC defined by laws (13). Then the relation
 AC := (∼=AC ◦ ) is terminating, and confluent modulo ∼=AC. The set of normal forms
M⇓ := {N | M  ∗AC N 6 AC} is then guaranteed to be finite, computable, and such that
M ∼= N ⇐⇒ (M⇓ ∩N⇓) 6= ∅.
We can harmonise the equational theory of XOR with the deduction system of Figure 1
by adding the rules
Γ ` 0 Xor0
Γ `M1 Γ `M2
Γ `M1 ⊕M2
XorR
Γ,M1,M2,M1 ⊕M2 ` N
Γ,M1,M2 ` N
XorL
Γ,M,M⇓ ` N
Γ,M ` N ⇓L
Γ ` N N ∈M⇓
Γ `M ⇓R
The deduction system accurately models XOR, even if it uses ⇓ instead of ∼=: as proven
in [12, Prop. 1], one can always restrict the intruder to manipulate messages in normal form
without loosing expressive power.
We are left to prove that the derivability satisfies the effective absorbing intruder axioms.
Decidability has been proven in [1, 12]. The axioms of Definitions 1 and 20 are easily satisfied
by the same arguments we used for Ien. The proofs of (Relevancy) and absorption make use
of the fact that if N ∈M⇓ then fn(N) ⊆ fn(M).
We conjecture Diffie-Hellman exponentiation (following the model of e.g. [31]) can be
shown to satisfy our axioms in the same way we treated XOR. The main issue with Diffie-
Hellman, with respect to (Relevancy) and absorption, is the inverses law M ∗M−1 ∼= 1: by
using the law from right to left, one can involve arbitrary names in a derivation. This could
be handled in the same way we handle cancellation of XOR, by normalising derivations so
that the law is always applied left to right. We leave the formal development of this remark
as future work.
A delicate point is the bounded message size assumption. With advanced primitives like
XOR it is easier (but not inevitable) to encounter protocols for which it is impossible to
extend the results on the bounded model to the unbounded case.
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I Towards Unbounded Message Size
The analysis presented in Section 3 considers only traces (and attacks) involving messages
of size smaller than some given bound s. We show here how the results of the analysis
can be generalised to inductive invariants for the full set of traces, with no restriction on
the size. Because of undecidability of the general problem, this generalisation will not be
precise for every protocol: there are protocols for which the most precise generalised limit is
trivial (i.e. does not ensure any non-trivial property of the protocol). For the protocols in
our benchmarks however, one can get precise invariants by generalising the ones inferred by
the tool.
We first introduce the syntax and semantics of generalised limits, and describe how we
can use them to generalise our benchmarks. Finally, although studying how to automate this
generalisation is beyond the scope of this paper, we briefly sketch how p̂ost can be adapted
to work on generalised limits.
Aside: finer size bounds via typing In our development, we assumed a global size bound s.
To have finer control on the message sizes, as we do in our tool, one can introduce a primitive
form of typing. Assuming wlog that all pattern variables are unique, a typing is a partial
function ty : N ⇀ N, assigning to each pattern variable a maximum size for the messages it
can match. A typing induces a typed transition relation →∆,ty which only matches patterns
with subsitutions respecting ty; reachty∆(P ) collects all the terms reachable from P through
→∆,ty. A typing ty of P,∆ is s-bounding if reachty∆(P ) ⊆ Ss. One can check if ty is s-bounding
on-the-fly while computing p̂ost.
I.1 Generalised Limits
Recall the “encryption oracle” of Example 15: E[k] = in(x : x).(〈e(x)k〉 ‖ E[k]). Without
any restrictions on the pattern variable x, there is no way to prevent the encryption chains
described in Example 15. However, we can use the 2-bounding typing ty = [x 7→ 1], to
obtain the limit E[k ] ‖ (νm.〈e(m)k〉)ω which is inductive (wrt→∆,ty) and contains the initial
state E[k ]. Since x is never inspected, injecting larger messages in it would not lead to new
behaviour. We represent this arbitrary injection of messages in a limit by introducing a
“wildcard” annotation on occurrences of names a?.
Technically, we duplicate the set of names N to a disjoint set of ?-annotated names
N ? := {a? | a ∈ N}, and we allow messages to contain names from N unionmulti N ?. All the
definitions of this paper can be adapted straightforwardly to support wildcards by simply not
distinguishing between a and a?. To stress the fact that a set of processes/limits contains
annotations, we annotate the set with a wildcard, e.g. L?s,k.
I Definition 60 (Wildcard semantics). Given P ∈ P?, its wildcard semantics is defined as
WJP K := {P ′ ∣∣∣∣∣ sf(P ) = ν~x.(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q), P ′ ≡kn ν~x,~c.
(
(〈Γ〉 ‖ Q)[ ~M/~y ? ])
~y ? = names(P ) ∩N ?,names( ~M) ⊆ ~x ∪ ~c
}
For L ∈ L?s,k, define WJLK := {WJP K | P ∈ JLK }.
With the help of wildcards, we can then take a limit L, annotate it with wildcards
obtaining a limit L?. Then we can check that the wildcards generalise the limit enough to
make it inductive wrt →∆ (i.e. without restricting the message size):
∀P ∈ WJL?K,∀Q : P →∆ Q =⇒ Q ∈ WJL?K (15)
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For our encryption oracle example, the annotated limit E[k ] ‖ (νm.〈e(m?)k〉)ω represents an
inductive invariant for the unrestricted semantics.
For a more realistic application of generalised limits, consider our running Example 9.
The limit of Figure 5 is inductive with respect to the typing ty = [na 7→ 1]. To remove the
size bound we only need to annotate the occurrence of na in L2 obtaining the limit L?:
L? = νa, b, kas, kbs.(〈a, b〉 ‖ A1[a, b, kas ]ω ‖ B1[a, b, kbs ]ω ‖ S[a, b, kas, kbs ]ω ‖ Lω1 )
L1 = νna.
(〈na〉 ‖ A2[a, b, kas, na ] ‖ Lω2 )
L2 = νk.
(〈e(k)(n?a,kas)〉 ‖ 〈e(k)kbs〉 ‖ Secret[k ]ω ‖ A3[a, b, kas, k ]ω ‖ Lω3 )
L3 = νnb.
(〈e(nb)(k,k)〉 ‖ 〈e(nb)k〉 ‖ B2[a, b, kbs, nb, k ])
Indeed this generalised limit is inductive: the intruder can send any message (M, b) to the
server S[a, b, kas, kbs ] := in(x : (x, b)).
(
. . .
〈
e(k)(x,kas)
〉
. . .
)
, which will use it as part of the
encryption key (M,kas). None of the input patterns of the other processes would however
be able to match the message e(k)(M,kas) unless M = na; thus this attack attempt will not
generate new behaviour, and our generalised limit captures all the reachable configurations
without assuming bounds on the size of messages.
Similarly, it is not difficult to annotate the limits of our benchmarks so that the generalised
limits satisfy condition (15):
ARPC: There is only one annotation reasonable: (n?x, (k, b)). This is still inductive even
though it can be fed back as we can have a different substitutions for n?x.
KSL: We annotate B2[a, b, kbb, kbs, n?x, ny] in L2 and e(nz, (b, n?x, ))kxy in L4. A knows the
actual nx as it produced it and hence it is still inductive.
KSLr: Additionally to KSL, we annotate e(m?x,my)kxy and B5[a, b, kbb, kbs, kab, ty,m?x,my]
in L7. The new message cannot flow into B3[−] or D2[−] as both pattern-match names
on the second position which are different from my. However, due to the wildcard as
parameter which could become my, B4[−] can produce B5[−]’s input message. This is
still covered and inductive but does not comply with an normal reauthentification run.
NHS: We annotate e(n?, (b, e(k, a)kbs))kas in L2. A can only match on the original n so
it is still inductive.
NHSr: Same annotations as in NHS. Additionally, we annotate e(one, s?)k. in L3 and
hence have to annotate the s in Secret[s? ] as well as Leak[s? ]. This covers all the enabled
transitions and is hence inductive.
NHSs: The same annotation as in NHS works.
OR/ORl: We annotate e(ny, (m?, (a, b)))kbs in L2. This does not enable any new transition
so it is inductive.
ORs: Same annotation as OR/ORl. But we also have to annotate the key kxy which we
declare as secret which is the difference to ORl and hence does not work here.
ORa: Similar annotation to OR/ORl. Analogously, inductivity is preserved.
YAH: We annotate e(a, (n?a, nb))kbs in L3. This can be fed back to B2[−] and hence we
also annotate e(nb)(n?a,nb) in L5. This is still inductive.
YAHs1: We annotate as in YAH. The declaration of a secret happens only if A plays
back and hence it is inductive.
YAHs2: Without the size constraint for the key, the invariant obtained for YAHs1 is also
one for YAHs2.
YAHlk: We annotate e(one, s?)k in L4 which represents the case where the key k is leaked.
This annotation covers all newly enabled transitions. In case k is not leaked, there are no
new transitions. Hence, it is inductive.
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I.2 Towards Automating Generalisation
Automating the check of condition (15) is beyond the scope of this paper, but we can sketch
how one would approach the problem by adapting our p̂ost definition to work on generalised
limits. The idea is that one can design a computable function p̂ostty∆,?, a “symbolic” version
of p̂ost, and b satisfying:
L?1 b L?2 =⇒ WJL?1K ⊆ WJL?2K (16)
post(WJL?K) ⊆ WJp̂ostty∆,?(L?)K (17)
With these components, one can check (15) by checking p̂ostty∆,?(L?) b L?. Note that
(16) is an implication, and (17) a subset relation: an equivalence would be impossible to
achieve due to undecidability of the general problem; we therefore only require a sound
over-approximation.
Designing b requires defining an approximate version of ≤kn which can work on ?-annot-
ated sets of messages. A precise version of this can only be defined on a per-intruder-model
basis. A generic definition of b could simply extend the non-annotated inclusion check with
the axioms x? ≤kn x? and M ≤kn x?.
Designing a suitable p̂ostty∆,?(L?) similarly depends on the choice of intruder-model. One
could, for example, define a symbolic matching function match(Γ?, ~x : N?) returning a finite
set of substitutions such that
Γ ` N?θ ∧ Γ ∈ WJΓ?K =⇒ ∃σ ∈ match(Γ?, ~x : N?) : N?θ ∈ WJN?σK
and use it in p̂ostty∆,? to find all symbolic redexes. It is relatively straightforward to define
a match function that is precise enough to check the generalised limits of our benchmarks.
Exploring the design of these symbolic analyses in general is left for future work.
J Benchmarks
The Needham-Schröder protocol [27] is modelled with and without secrecy (NHS/NHSs).
The NHSr version models leaks of old session keys, which leads to a replay attack (and hence
the invariant is leaky). We provide four models of the Otway-Rees protocol [28]. OR does
not model secrecy and is used to prove the protocol depth-bounded. ORl models secrecy but
the inferred invariant contains a genuine leak, which is the result of a known type-confusion
attack. The attack substitutes a composite message for some input x that is (wrongly)
assumed to be a nonce by a principal. ORa models authentication and the invariant shows
the genuine misauthentication based on this attack. ORs models the same situation with the
assumption that x is of size one; with this assumption the inferred invariant is not leaky.
ARPC models Lowe’s modified BAN concrete ARPC protocol [24] (we model succ(-) with
pairs, i.e. succ((zero,−)) is (one,−)). We modelled the Kehne-Schönwälder-Landendörfer
protocol [24], as modified by Lowe, with (KSLr) and without (KSL) re-authentication.
We produced four models of the Yahalom protocol [9]. Our first model (YAH) does not
model secrecy and is used to establish depth-boundedness. The protocol has a type-confusion
attack (similar to the case of Otway-Rees) which does not lead to a leak of a secret. This is
modelled in YAHs1. We rule out this type-confusion by adding a size assumption in YAHs2.
YAHlk is a variant where an additional fresh nonce is exchanged at the beginning of each
session, which makes the protocol secret even when old session keys can be leaked, a property
entailed by the inferred invariant.
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K Example of Incorporation
Consider the limit L = νy.
((
νx.(A[x] ‖ B[y, x]ω))ω). To compute p̂ost we consider the limit
L⊗ 1 = νy.
((
νx.(A[x] ‖ B[y, x] ‖ B[y, x]ω)) ‖ (νx.(A[x] ‖ B[y, x]ω))ω) and assume
A[x]→ νz.(A[z] ‖ B[y, z ]) ‖ B[y, x] = P.
Then, p̂ost will contain the limit L′ = C[P ] for C[•] = νy.
((
νx.( • ‖ B[y, x] ‖ B[y, x]ω)) ‖(
νx.(A[x] ‖ B[y, x]ω))ω). Since we are trying to prove inclusion between L and L′ = C[P ],
and L is equivalent to L⊗ 1 = C[A[x]], it seems likely that the inclusion could be proven by
matching C with C in the two limits, and by matching P in L⊗ 1. Intuitively:
νy.
((
νx.( A[x] ‖ B[y, x] ‖ B[y, x]ω )) ‖ ( νx.(A[x] ‖ B[y, x]ω) )ω)
νy.
((
νx.( νz.(A[z ] ‖ B[y, z ]) ‖ B[y, x] ‖ B[y, x] ‖ B[y, x]ω )) ‖ (νx.(A[x] ‖ B[y, x]ω))ω)
where the part in blue is P and the context C is the part in black. The arrows indicate the
sublimits that can be further unfolded to show the inclusion of C[P ].
Formally, we want to check that ∀L′ ∈ p̂osts∆(L) : JL′K ⊆ JLK. By construction, L′ = C[P ]
for some context C such that L⊗ b = C[Q[ ~M ]]. Then, if we can find P in the fixed part of
sf(L⊗ n), conditions (A) and (B) of Theorem 22 are automatically satisfied because of the
shared context C.
